App Certification Ecosystems and Market Gatekeeping

1. Introduction

App certification ecosystems refer to systems in which a platform owner controls whether an application may enter, remain in, or receive certain privileges within a digital ecosystem. Certification may involve:

security review;

technical compatibility;

privacy compliance;

content rules;

payment-system requirements;

identity verification;

API permissions;

app-store listing;

updates and continuing compliance.

Examples include mobile ecosystems such as Apple's iOS/App Store and Google's Android/Google Play.

The competition-law problem arises when the same company acts simultaneously as:

operating-system provider;

app-store operator;

certification authority;

payment intermediary;

competitor to third-party apps; and

controller of access to users.

This can create market gatekeeping: competitors may technically exist, but their ability to reach consumers depends upon obtaining access controlled by the dominant platform.

The European Commission expressly treats Apple's App Store and Google's Play Store as important app-distribution gateways, while the EU Digital Markets Act (DMA) now imposes specific obligations concerning alternative distribution, steering, payment systems and fair access. (Digital Markets Act (DMA))

2. Meaning of App Certification Ecosystem

An app certification ecosystem is broader than an ordinary app store.

It can contain:

Developer → Certification → App Store → Operating System → Payment System → User

The platform can control several stages simultaneously.

Main components

A. Technical certification

The platform determines whether an app:

uses permitted APIs;

satisfies technical standards;

functions properly;

meets security requirements.

B. Security certification

The platform may examine:

malware;

permissions;

code behaviour;

data collection;

security vulnerabilities.

C. Content certification

Apps may be assessed according to:

prohibited content;

age classifications;

advertising rules;

gambling rules;

political or controversial content policies;

consumer-protection requirements.

D. Payment certification

The platform may require developers to use:

proprietary in-app payment systems;

approved billing APIs;

prescribed payment arrangements.

E. Distribution certification

The platform can determine:

whether an app is listed;

whether it can be updated;

whether it can access particular APIs;

whether alternative stores can operate;

whether sideloading is permitted.

This last category has the greatest competition-law significance because certification can become a condition for market access.

3. What Is Market Gatekeeping?

Market gatekeeping occurs where an undertaking controls an important route through which businesses reach consumers.

In digital markets, gatekeeping can arise from:

network effects;

high switching costs;

ecosystem lock-in;

technical dependencies;

control over app distribution;

control over operating-system APIs;

control over payment systems;

default settings;

certification requirements;

access to user data.

The European Commission's Android analysis recognised that an app store may constitute a distinct market because it performs the particular function of allowing users to download and manage applications and because platform-specific switching can create significant barriers. (European Commission)

4. Why Certification Can Become an Antitrust Problem

Certification itself is not automatically unlawful.

A platform normally has legitimate reasons to certify apps, particularly:

cybersecurity;

privacy;

consumer safety;

technical reliability;

fraud prevention.

The legal issue arises when certification is used as a mechanism to exclude competitors or protect the platform's own downstream business.

For example:

Platform owns the operating system → platform owns the app store → platform competes with third-party apps → platform decides which competitors receive certification.

This creates a potential vertical conflict of interest.

The important legal questions become:

Is the platform dominant?

What is the relevant market?

Is access to the platform commercially indispensable?

Are certification criteria objective and transparent?

Are equivalent applications treated equally?

Does certification impose discriminatory conditions?

Does the platform self-preference its own applications?

Are certification requirements proportionate?

Does certification prevent alternative distribution?

Does the system raise rivals' costs?

5. Certification as an Essential Gateway

A particularly important concept is the gateway effect.

Suppose 95% of consumers using a particular operating system obtain apps through one controlled store.

The store then becomes more than an ordinary marketplace.

It becomes an access infrastructure.

The platform can potentially influence:

who enters → what products are visible → how products are monetised → what payment method is used → how consumers communicate with developers.

The EU's DMA addresses precisely this type of structural dependence. It requires designated gatekeepers to permit alternative app distribution and restricts certain forms of steering and mandatory use of proprietary payment systems. (Digital Markets Act (DMA))

6. Important Competition-Law Theories

A. Abuse of dominant position

Under Article 102 TFEU and equivalent national laws, a dominant undertaking must not use its position to distort competition.

Potential conduct includes:

discriminatory certification;

exclusionary access rules;

tying;

refusal of access;

self-preferencing;

excessive or unfair conditions;

anti-steering restrictions.

B. Refusal of access

A certification system may become problematic where access is effectively indispensable for reaching users and the platform unjustifiably refuses access.

The analysis normally considers:

indispensability;

elimination of effective competition;

objective justification;

proportionality.

C. Self-preferencing

A platform may certify third-party applications under stricter conditions while giving its own applications:

faster approval;

better visibility;

greater API access;

preferential technical treatment;

default status.

This can potentially disadvantage rivals.

D. Tying

Certification can also become part of tying.

For example:

"You can access our app store only if you accept our proprietary payment system."

or:

"To receive the certification necessary for our store, developers must use our other service."

The legality depends upon the particular market structure and effects.

E. Raising rivals' costs

Certification requirements can increase rivals' costs through:

repeated audits;

expensive compliance;

mandatory technical modifications;

payment commissions;

delayed approvals;

additional contractual obligations.

If the incumbent's own service does not bear equivalent costs, competitive neutrality can be affected.

7. Case Law

Case 1 — Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc.

United States, Ninth Circuit, 2023 — 67 F.4th 946

This is one of the leading modern cases involving app-store gatekeeping.

Epic challenged Apple's restrictions concerning:

App Store distribution;

alternative payment mechanisms;

anti-steering provisions.

The Ninth Circuit addressed Apple's contractual restrictions and Epic's competition claims. The court did not accept Epic's Sherman Act monopoly-market theory in the manner Epic proposed, but it upheld important relief concerning Apple's anti-steering restrictions under California law.

The case is important because it demonstrates that control over app distribution and developer communications can have competition-law consequences even when a platform presents its rules as ecosystem-management rules. (Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals CDN)

Principle

App-store contractual restrictions must be examined not merely as private contractual rules but potentially for their competitive effects.

8. Case 2 — Epic Games, Inc. v. Google LLC

U.S. District Court, Northern District of California

This litigation concerned Google's control over the Google Play ecosystem.

A jury found Google liable on Epic's principal antitrust theories concerning the Play Store and Google Play Billing. The subsequent remedial proceedings considered measures designed to provide greater opportunities for competing app stores.

Evidence before the court concerned the strong network effects of Google Play: users attract developers, developers attract users, and that feedback loop can make entry difficult. (Justia Dockets & Filings)

Principle

The case illustrates:

users → developers → applications → users

as a self-reinforcing ecosystem.

A rival app store may therefore face a chicken-and-egg problem:

Few users → few developers → few apps → few users.

This is a classic digital-market barrier.

9. Case 3 — Google Android / Google and Alphabet v Commission

General Court, Case T-604/18, 14 September 2022

This is one of the most important European cases concerning mobile ecosystems.

The case concerned Google's Android ecosystem and included issues involving:

Google Play Store;

Google Search;

Chrome;

device manufacturers;

exclusivity payments;

anti-fragmentation obligations;

product bundling.

The General Court examined Android as a multi-sided platform and considered the interaction between operating-system control and app-store distribution. (InfoCuria)

The Commission's original Android decision found, among other things, that Google had restricted manufacturers from using Android forks when they wanted to obtain Google's proprietary apps, including the Play Store. (European Commission)

Principle

Control over an operating system can be leveraged into related markets when access to important platform components is conditioned on restrictive contractual arrangements.

10. Case 4 — European Commission — Apple App Store Practices (Music Streaming)

Case AT.40437 — Apple App Store Practices

This proceeding originated from Spotify's complaint concerning Apple's App Store practices.

The Commission considered Apple's position in the distribution of music-streaming applications to iOS users and examined Apple's anti-steering provisions.

The Commission concluded in 2024 that Apple's restrictions on steering constituted an infringement of Article 102 TFEU. The case concerned restrictions preventing music-streaming developers from effectively informing users about alternative purchasing possibilities outside the app. (European Commission)

Principle

A platform may have competition-law responsibility where its control over app distribution is used to restrict developers' ability to communicate alternative commercial offers to consumers.

11. Case 5 — Microsoft Corp. v Commission

Case T-201/04, General Court, 17 September 2007

Although this case concerned the PC operating-system environment rather than a modern smartphone app store, it provides an important foundation for analysing platform gatekeeping.

Microsoft was found to have abused its dominant position through, among other things:

refusal to supply interoperability information;

tying Windows with Windows Media Player.

The General Court upheld the essential elements of the Commission's infringement decision. (InfoCuria)

Relevance to app ecosystems

The underlying lesson is that control over a technologically important platform can create opportunities to extend market power into neighbouring markets.

Thus:

OS dominance → control of technical environment → advantage in adjacent market

can be relevant to competition analysis.

12. Case 6 — Google Play Store — Competition Commission of India

CCI proceedings concerning Google's Android ecosystem

The Competition Commission of India has examined the structure of the Android app-store market and identified significant network effects and barriers to entry.

In its Android-related analysis, the CCI noted that Google Play had a substantially larger developer base than competing Android app stores and that developers had incentives to prioritise Google Play because of its larger user base. (Competition Commission of India)

The CCI's analysis therefore illustrates the same ecosystem phenomenon:

large user base → large developer base → larger app catalogue → more users.

Principle

Network effects can make competing app stores difficult to establish even where alternative technical stores theoretically exist.

13. Case 7 — Google Play / Digital Markets Act Proceedings

The EU's newer DMA regime provides a particularly direct legal framework for app-store gatekeeping.

Apple and Google were designated as gatekeepers for their respective app stores. The DMA requires, among other things:

alternative app distribution;

alternative app stores;

web distribution in appropriate circumstances;

developer steering;

access to alternative purchasing channels;

restrictions on mandatory proprietary payment systems;

fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory access conditions. (Digital Markets Act (DMA))

In July 2026, the European Commission found Google non-compliant with the DMA's anti-steering obligations concerning Google Play and imposed a €430 million fine in that proceeding. (Digital Markets Act (DMA))

This is particularly important because it moves beyond traditional ex-post abuse-of-dominance litigation toward ex-ante regulation of gatekeeper behaviour.

14. Certification and Self-Preferencing

A major concern arises where a platform competes with the very developers whose applications it certifies.

Consider:

The platform therefore has the ability to influence several competitive parameters simultaneously.

This creates a potential dual-role problem:

Regulator of the ecosystem + competitor inside the ecosystem.

15. Neutral Certification vs Exclusionary Certification

Legitimate certification

Certification is generally easier to justify where it is:

objective;

transparent;

technically necessary;

consistently applied;

proportionate;

security-related;

equally applicable to the platform's own applications.

Potentially problematic certification

Greater competition concerns arise where certification is:

discriminatory;

unpredictable;

selectively enforced;

unnecessarily expensive;

deliberately slow for competitors;

linked to unrelated services;

designed to prevent alternative stores;

used to restrict competing payment systems.

16. Network Effects

App ecosystems are strongly affected by two-sided or multi-sided network effects.

Developer side

More users make the platform attractive to developers.

Consumer side

More apps make the platform attractive to consumers.

This produces:

More users → more developers → more apps → more users

A dominant platform may therefore become difficult to challenge even if a rival technically offers a better product.

This explains why competition authorities increasingly focus on contestability, not merely current market share.

17. Switching Costs

Users may hesitate to change ecosystems because they have:

purchased apps;

subscriptions;

stored data;

contacts;

cloud accounts;

accessories;

device-specific services;

established workflows.

Developers similarly face:

redevelopment costs;

new certification costs;

different APIs;

separate payment systems;

fragmented user bases;

additional customer-support costs.

Consequently, the threat of switching may be weaker than it appears.

18. Certification as an Entry Barrier

Certification can become an entry barrier when a new platform must obtain recognition from an incumbent-controlled ecosystem.

The economic structure may look like:

Incumbent platform

↓ controls

Certification

↓ controls

Distribution

↓ controls

Consumer access

↓ creates

Developer dependence

This can reinforce incumbent market power.

19. App Store Payment Gatekeeping

Payment systems are particularly significant because the platform can potentially control:

transaction processing;

commissions;

subscription billing;

refunds;

customer acquisition;

external payment links.

The EU DMA therefore specifically regulates the relationship between app distribution and payment mechanisms. It prohibits designated gatekeepers from imposing their in-app payment systems in circumstances covered by Article 5(7), while also protecting developer steering. (Digital Markets Act (DMA))

20. Anti-Steering

Anti-steering means restricting a developer from telling users:

"You can buy this product more cheaply through our website."

From a competition perspective, anti-steering can prevent consumers from learning about alternative purchasing channels.

The Apple–Spotify proceeding is particularly important because the Commission treated Apple's anti-steering restrictions as potentially affecting both:

competing music-streaming services; and

consumers. (EUR-Lex)

The DMA subsequently created an explicit anti-steering obligation.

21. Alternative App Stores

Traditional app-store competition is unusual because the incumbent may control the operating system on which the rival store must operate.

For example:

Operating system owner → App Store owner → certification authority

A rival store may therefore need technical permission from the company it is attempting to compete against.

The DMA specifically requires Apple and Google to facilitate alternative app-distribution channels, thereby addressing this structural problem. (Digital Markets Act (DMA))

22. Interoperability

Interoperability is another important solution.

A platform can maintain dominance by restricting competitors' access to:

APIs;

device functions;

messaging functions;

hardware interfaces;

authentication;

notification systems;

AI functionality.

The EU has increasingly treated interoperability as part of mobile-platform contestability. In 2026, the Commission issued measures concerning Google's Android interoperability, including access for competing AI services to relevant Android functionality. (Digital Markets Act (DMA))

23. Legal Tests for Certification Gatekeeping

A competition authority or court can examine:

Step 1 — Relevant market

Possible markets include:

mobile operating systems;

app stores;

app distribution;

in-app payment services;

particular categories of apps.

Step 2 — Dominance/gatekeeper status

Consider:

market share;

user numbers;

developer numbers;

network effects;

switching costs;

entry barriers;

ecosystem integration.

Step 3 — Conduct

Identify:

certification refusal;

discriminatory treatment;

tying;

self-preferencing;

anti-steering;

payment restrictions;

exclusive dealing;

interoperability restrictions.

Step 4 — Competitive effects

Examine whether conduct:

excludes rivals;

raises rivals' costs;

reduces innovation;

increases prices;

reduces consumer choice;

prevents entry;

protects the platform's own downstream service.

Step 5 — Objective justification

The platform may rely on:

cybersecurity;

privacy;

fraud prevention;

technical integrity;

consumer safety.

The central question is whether the restriction is genuinely necessary and proportionate to that legitimate objective.

24. Relationship Between Competition Law and the DMA

Traditional competition law generally operates after problematic conduct has been established.

The DMA takes a more preventive approach.

Traditional model

Dominance → abusive conduct → investigation → infringement decision

DMA model

Gatekeeper designation → predefined obligations → compliance monitoring → enforcement

This distinction is particularly important for app certification ecosystems.

25. Remedies

Possible remedies include:

Structural remedies

separation of app-store functions;

separation of payment functions;

restrictions on vertical integration.

Behavioural remedies

objective certification criteria;

equal treatment;

transparent review;

appeal procedures;

reasonable certification fees.

Access remedies

alternative app stores;

sideloading;

web distribution;

API access;

interoperability.

Commercial remedies

alternative payment systems;

steering;

external purchasing;

fair contractual terms.

26. Emerging Issue: AI-App Certification

The same legal problem is likely to become increasingly important for:

AI assistants;

AI agents;

autonomous apps;

generative-AI applications;

AI marketplaces.

Suppose an operating-system provider owns its own AI assistant while controlling certification of competing AI assistants.

It could potentially control:

certification → API access → default status → notifications → device integration → user discovery.

The competition-law issue would therefore extend from ordinary app-store gatekeeping to AI ecosystem gatekeeping.

The EU's 2026 Android interoperability measures concerning competing AI services illustrate how this issue is already moving into regulatory practice. (Digital Markets Act (DMA))

27. Key Case-Law Principles — Quick Revision

28. Conclusion

App certification ecosystems are potentially powerful forms of digital market gatekeeping because certification can determine whether a developer obtains access to users, APIs, payment infrastructure and visibility.

Certification is not inherently anti-competitive. Security, privacy and technical-integrity requirements can be legitimate. The competition-law concern arises when certification becomes a strategic bottleneck through which a dominant platform can favour itself, disadvantage rivals, prevent alternative distribution, restrict payment competition or increase rivals' costs.

The major modern cases—from Microsoft, through Google Android, Epic Games v Apple, Epic Games v Google, and the Apple–Spotify/App Store proceedings—show the development from traditional platform-abuse principles toward specialised regulation of digital gatekeepers.

The EU DMA represents the clearest move toward an ex-ante contestability model, requiring major app-store gatekeepers to permit greater alternative distribution, steering, payment choice and interoperability. (Digital Markets Act (DMA))

Ultra-short exam keywords

App certification → gatekeeper → app store → OS control → network effects → switching costs → ecosystem lock-in → certification discrimination → self-preferencing → tying → anti-steering → payment restrictions → interoperability → alternative app stores → contestability → Article 102 TFEU → DMA.