Attention as a Substitutable Economic Currency in Antitrust Analysis

1. Introduction

Attention has become an important economic resource in digital markets. Many online services appear to be “free” because users pay no monetary price, but users pay with time, attention, engagement, data, and exposure to advertising.

Examples include:

Search engines

Social-media platforms

Video-sharing platforms

Streaming services

Online news

Maps and navigation

Gaming platforms

Short-video applications

AI assistants and content platforms

The central antitrust question is:

If two products compete for the same limited amount of user attention, can they be treated as substitutes even when they provide different services and charge zero monetary prices?

The answer can be yes as an economic analytical possibility, but attention is not currently a universally recognized separate legal currency or market-definition test. Traditional antitrust law normally examines substitutability through price, output, quality, functionality and other competitive conditions. In digital markets, however, time and attention can help reveal competitive constraints that a monetary-price analysis misses.

Recent scholarship has expressly proposed analysing “attention markets” through time spent and applying an attention-based version of the SSNIP concept. (American Bar Association)

2. Meaning of “Attention as an Economic Currency”

Basic idea

In an attention economy:

Users exchange scarce time and attention for access to digital services, while platforms monetize that attention through advertising, data, subscriptions, transactions or other commercial mechanisms.

For example:

User → 30 minutes of attention → Social-media platform

The platform may then sell advertising opportunities associated with that attention:

Platform → targeted advertising opportunity → Advertiser

Therefore, the platform may have:

zero monetary price to users;

substantial economic value derived from users;

advertisers paying for access to users' attention.

Simple example

Suppose a person has only 2 hours of discretionary online attention.

They can spend it on:

Instagram

YouTube

TikTok

Netflix

online gaming

news

Google searches

Even though these services are functionally different, they may compete for the same scarce resource: the user's time and attention.

3. Why Attention Matters in Antitrust

Traditional antitrust analysis can become difficult where:

Price = ₹0 / $0 / €0

A conventional price increase may therefore provide little information about substitution.

For example:

Google Search = free

YouTube = free

Instagram = free

Facebook = free

Yet these platforms can compete for:

time;

engagement;

clicks;

screen time;

advertising budgets;

user data;

behavioural information.

The European Commission's Google Android litigation illustrates this economic structure: the General Court noted that Google's business model involved products and services generally supplied free to users while monetizing user data through online advertising. (curia)

4. Attention as a Scarce Resource

Attention has several economic characteristics.

4.1 Scarcity

A person has limited:

hours per day;

cognitive capacity;

screen time;

willingness to engage.

Therefore:

One platform's increase in engagement can reduce the attention available to another platform.

4.2 Non-monetary price

The user may pay:

₹0;

$0;

€0.

But the user may pay indirectly through:

advertising exposure;

data;

privacy;

time;

behavioural profiling;

reduced attention available elsewhere.

4.3 Opportunity cost

If a consumer spends 60 minutes watching YouTube, that is potentially 60 minutes unavailable for:

TikTok;

Instagram;

Netflix;

gaming;

news.

This is the attention opportunity cost.

5. Attention Substitutability

The key concept is substitutability.

Two products can be attention substitutes when:

A significant change in the attractiveness of one causes users to redirect their scarce attention toward another.

For example:

TikTok becomes less attractive → users spend more time on Instagram Reels.

This suggests strong attention substitutability.

But:

Google Maps becomes less attractive → users move to Apple Maps/Waze

would represent a more narrowly defined attention market.

The question therefore becomes:

How broadly should the attention market be defined?

6. The A-SSNIP Concept

Traditional market definition sometimes uses the SSNIP test:

Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Price.

But if the consumer price is zero, the traditional test becomes difficult.

One scholarly proposal is an:

A-SSNIP

Attentional Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Price

Instead of asking:

“Would consumers switch if price increased?”

the analysis could ask:

“Would consumers substantially redirect their limited attention if the platform became less attractive?”

For example:

Platform A: 60 minutes of daily attention

If its quality declines significantly:

Platform A: 40 minutes

Platform B: rises from 20 to 40 minutes

This could indicate substitution.

Importantly, A-SSNIP is an analytical proposal, not an established statutory antitrust test. (American Bar Association)

7. Attention and Two-Sided Markets

Digital platforms frequently operate on multiple sides.

Side 1 — Users

Users provide:

attention;

engagement;

data;

content;

network effects.

Side 2 — Advertisers

Advertisers provide:

money;

advertising demand;

commercial revenue.

Thus:

Users → Attention → Platform → Advertising inventory → Advertisers → Revenue

This means the platform may compete simultaneously for:

user attention; and

advertiser spending.

8. Attention as an Input

Attention can also be treated as an economic input.

For advertising platforms:

User attention → advertising inventory → monetization

A platform with millions of highly engaged users may possess valuable advertising inventory even if users pay nothing.

Therefore, competition authorities may need to consider:

number of users;

time spent;

engagement;

frequency;

advertising exposure;

click-through rates;

quality of audience;

targeting capability.

9. Attention and Market Definition

Traditional market definition asks whether products are sufficiently substitutable.

Attention analysis adds another question:

Do the products compete for the same pool of scarce user attention?

Narrow attention market

For example:

Google Maps ↔ Apple Maps ↔ Waze

Medium attention market

TikTok ↔ Instagram Reels ↔ YouTube Shorts

Broad attention market

Social media ↔ streaming video ↔ gaming ↔ online entertainment

The appropriate boundary depends on evidence.

10. Important Antitrust Effects

A. Market power

A platform may have substantial market power if it can capture a large share of users' attention and advertisers depend upon that attention.

B. Foreclosure

A dominant platform might prevent rival services from obtaining sufficient attention by:

preferential ranking;

self-preferencing;

exclusive contracts;

default settings;

tying;

restrictions on interoperability;

restricting access to data;

limiting rival advertising;

suppressing rival applications.

C. Quality competition

Where price is zero, competition may occur through:

privacy;

speed;

content quality;

recommendation quality;

advertising intensity;

user experience;

security;

interoperability.

Thus, a reduction in quality can potentially function like a price increase.

11. Attention and Advertising Load

One particularly important issue is advertising intensity.

Suppose:

Platform A

60 minutes of useful content

10 minutes of advertising

becomes:

60 minutes of useful content

25 minutes of advertising.

The monetary price remains zero.

But the user's effective non-monetary cost has increased.

The user may therefore switch to another platform.

This is why attention-based analysis can connect quality, advertising load and competition.

The FTC's litigation against Meta has specifically involved allegations concerning advertising intensity and quality in a zero-price social-networking environment; however, those allegations remain litigation claims and should not be treated as a final judicial finding unless and until established by judgment. (Federal Trade Commission)

12. Attention and Data

Attention and data frequently reinforce one another.

Cycle

More attention

↓

More user activity

↓

More behavioural data

↓

Better targeting/recommendation

↓

Better monetization

↓

More resources to attract attention

↓

More attention

This can produce a feedback loop.

A large platform can therefore benefit from:

economies of scale;

network effects;

data advantages;

recommendation advantages;

advertising advantages.

13. Attention and Network Effects

Suppose 100 million users are already using a platform.

Advertisers want to reach those users.

More advertisers provide more revenue.

More revenue allows the platform to improve:

content;

infrastructure;

algorithms;

creator incentives;

recommendation systems.

This can attract even more users.

Therefore:

Attention can strengthen network effects and create barriers to entry.

14. Case Law

Case 1 — Google Android

Google and Alphabet v European Commission, Case T-604/18; C-738/22 P

This is one of the most important modern authorities for understanding the economics of free digital services.

The case concerned Google's Android ecosystem, including:

Google Search;

Chrome;

Play Store;

Android;

device manufacturers;

search competition;

advertising revenue.

The General Court examined Google's contractual restrictions concerning pre-installation, anti-fragmentation and revenue-sharing arrangements. The economic background included Google's model of offering services free to users while obtaining revenue from advertising. (EUR-Lex)

Importantly, the Court of Justice issued a further judgment on 2 July 2026, concerning the appeal and issues including exclusionary effects and an as-efficient-competitor analysis. (EUR-Lex)

Relevance to attention

The case demonstrates that:

A zero monetary price does not mean that the underlying service lacks economic value or competitive significance.

15. Case 2 — Google Shopping

Google Search (Shopping), Commission Decision AT.39740

Google Shopping concerned preferential treatment of Google's own comparison-shopping service in general search results.

The competitive concern involved:

search visibility;

ranking;

traffic;

user attention;

clicks;

access to consumers.

Relevance

A search-results page is an extremely scarce attention allocation mechanism.

A higher-ranked result can capture:

more visibility;

more clicks;

more users;

more commercial opportunities.

Therefore, ranking can influence competition for attention even when the user pays nothing for search.

The case is particularly useful for understanding attention allocation through algorithms.

16. Case 3 — Facebook/Meta Antitrust Litigation

FTC v Facebook, Inc. / Meta Platforms, Inc., U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia

The FTC's case alleges that Facebook maintained monopoly power through conduct including its acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp and restrictions involving developers. The case remains a litigation matter rather than a final judicial determination of every allegation. (Federal Trade Commission)

Relevance to attention

Social-networking platforms compete for:

user time;

engagement;

social interactions;

content consumption;

advertising opportunities.

The FTC has also argued that zero monetary pricing does not make a market immune from Section 2 analysis. (Federal Trade Commission)

Principle

A zero-price product can still generate substantial competitive harm or benefit through changes in quality, advertising and user experience.

17. Case 4 — Ohio v American Express

Ohio v American Express Co., 585 U.S. 529 (2018)

This U.S. Supreme Court case concerned the two-sided nature of the credit-card market.

American Express operated a platform connecting:

cardholders; and

merchants.

The Court emphasized that the platform's two sides were interdependent.

Relevance to attention

Although this is not an “attention case,” it is highly useful by analogy.

Digital attention platforms similarly connect:

Users ↔ advertisers

or:

Users ↔ creators ↔ advertisers

Therefore, competitive analysis may need to consider interactions between multiple sides rather than examining one side in isolation.

18. Case 5 — Epic Games v Apple

Epic Games, Inc. v Apple Inc., 67 F.4th 946 (9th Cir. 2023), cert. denied 2024

The litigation concerned Apple's App Store ecosystem, payment rules, distribution restrictions and anti-steering provisions.

The court addressed questions involving:

platform power;

distribution;

app developers;

users;

payment systems;

steering.

Relevance to attention

The App Store controls important gateways through which applications reach users.

Consequently:

Control over distribution can translate into control over user attention.

A platform that controls discovery, ranking and distribution can affect which competing applications receive user attention.

This makes app-store governance relevant to attention-based competition even where attention itself is not the legally defined relevant market.

19. Case 6 — Microsoft v Commission

Microsoft v Commission, Case T-201/04

The General Court considered Microsoft's conduct involving interoperability information and tying.

The case is important for digital-platform economics because interoperability can determine whether competitors can effectively participate in a technology ecosystem.

Relevance to attention

If users cannot easily access competing services, rival firms may struggle to obtain:

users;

engagement;

data;

attention.

Thus:

Interoperability restriction → weaker rival access → less rival engagement → less attention → greater incumbent advantage.

20. Case 7 — United Brands v Commission

United Brands v Commission, Case 27/76

United Brands is a foundational Article 102 TFEU case concerning:

dominance;

relevant market;

substitutability;

consumer demand;

competitive constraints.

Relevance

The fundamental concept of substitutability remains important even when the relevant competitive variable changes.

Traditional analysis asks:

Would consumers switch to another product?

Attention-based analysis asks:

Would consumers redirect their scarce attention toward another service?

Thus, attention does not replace the concept of substitutability; it provides another potential dimension through which substitutability can be measured.

21. Case 8 — Google Adtech and Data-Related Practices

European Commission, Google — Adtech and Data-related Practices, AT.40670

The European Commission adopted a prohibition decision on 5 September 2025 concerning Google's ad-tech and data-related practices under Article 102 TFEU. (Competition Cases)

Relevance

Ad-tech competition is closely connected with monetization of user activity and attention.

The case demonstrates how competition law increasingly examines the infrastructure through which digital firms transform:

user activity → advertising opportunity → revenue.

22. Case-Law Table

23. Attention as a “Currency” vs Actual Money

It is important not to confuse the metaphor with legal reality.

Monetary currency

Money can:

purchase goods;

measure prices;

transfer value;

serve as a unit of account.

Attention

Attention:

cannot universally purchase goods;

has no fixed exchange rate;

varies dramatically between users;

varies according to context;

has different commercial value depending on audience;

is often converted indirectly into advertising revenue.

Therefore:

Attention is better described as a scarce economic resource or competitive currency, rather than a literal legal currency.

24. How Can Attention Be Measured?

Possible indicators include:

1. Time spent

Minutes per day or month.

2. Frequency

How frequently the consumer returns.

3. Engagement

Likes, comments, searches, clicks and interactions.

4. Session duration

Length of individual sessions.

5. Active users

Daily/monthly active users.

6. Retention

Whether consumers remain on the platform.

7. Advertising exposure

Number of advertisements shown.

8. Conversion

Whether attention generates purchases or clicks.

9. Share of attention

Percentage of total relevant consumer time captured by a platform.

25. Attention Share

A useful analytical concept is:

Attention Share=Time spent on Platform ATotal relevant attention timeAttention\ Share = \frac{Time\ spent\ on\ Platform\ A} {Total\ relevant\ attention\ time}

For example:

YouTube's attention share would be:

40/130=30.77%40/130 = 30.77\%

This could provide information about competitive position, although attention share should not automatically be treated as market share for legal purposes.

26. Attention and Quality Competition

In zero-price markets, quality may be more important than price.

Relevant quality dimensions include:

privacy;

advertising burden;

security;

content diversity;

algorithmic neutrality;

recommendation quality;

interoperability;

speed;

reliability.

Therefore:

A deterioration in quality may be competitively significant even when the monetary price remains zero.

This is especially important in digital markets.

27. Attention and Self-Preferencing

Suppose a dominant search engine owns:

Search;

Maps;

Shopping;

Travel;

Video.

If its algorithm gives its own service preferential placement, the effect may be:

Higher ranking

↓

More visibility

↓

More clicks

↓

More attention

↓

More data/revenue

↓

Greater competitive advantage

This illustrates why self-preferencing can affect competition even without raising consumer prices.

28. Attention and Gatekeeping

Gatekeepers may control:

app stores;

search rankings;

recommendation systems;

default settings;

browser interfaces;

operating systems;

advertising infrastructure.

Control over these gateways can determine who receives consumer attention.

The EU's current enforcement environment illustrates the point: in July 2026, the European Commission fined Google over alleged DMA violations concerning self-preferencing in Search and anti-steering restrictions in Google Play. (Digital Markets Act (DMA))

29. Attention and AI Platforms

Attention analysis becomes even more complicated with AI.

Consider:

Traditional search

User → query → many search results

versus

AI assistant

User → question → one synthesized answer.

If an AI assistant becomes the primary interface, it can potentially capture a larger proportion of the user's decision-making and informational attention.

Relevant competition questions include:

Who controls the interface?

Which AI receives default placement?

Which sources are presented?

Can competing AI assistants access users?

Can users easily switch?

Does the platform favour its own AI?

Does the platform restrict rival assistants?

These issues are increasingly relevant to digital-platform competition.

30. Problems With Attention-Based Market Definition

Attention analysis also has limitations.

1. Attention is difficult to measure

One minute spent on a platform may not equal one minute spent elsewhere.

2. Different attention has different value

A minute of:

financial research;

entertainment;

gaming;

shopping

may have different commercial value.

3. Functional differences remain important

Netflix and Google Maps both consume attention, but consumers do not necessarily consider them substitutes.

4. Multi-homing

Consumers can use multiple platforms simultaneously.

5. Quality differences

Time spent does not necessarily indicate consumer preference or welfare.

6. Privacy

Detailed attention measurement may require extensive personal data.

7. Legal uncertainty

There is no universally established “attention market” doctrine under Article 101/102 TFEU or U.S. antitrust law.

31. Attention Is Not Automatically the Relevant Market

This is the most important examination point.

It would be incorrect to say:

“Every platform competing for attention belongs to one relevant market.”

Instead:

Attention is one possible dimension of competitive substitutability.

Competition authorities still need to consider:

product characteristics;

consumer preferences;

functionality;

geographic scope;

switching;

multi-homing;

network effects;

quality;

data;

advertising;

actual competitive constraints.

32. Attention and Consumer Welfare

Attention-based antitrust analysis can potentially identify harms that price-based analysis misses.

For example:

Price = ₹0

but:

advertising increases;

privacy decreases;

content quality falls;

choice decreases;

algorithmic bias increases;

switching becomes difficult.

The monetary-price model may show no price increase.

An attention/quality model may nevertheless detect a change in competitive conditions.

33. Economic Model

A simplified platform model can be represented as:

User Attention→Engagement→Data→Advertising Value→RevenueUser\ Attention \rightarrow Engagement \rightarrow Data \rightarrow Advertising\ Value \rightarrow Revenue

A competition problem could arise if:

Market Power→Control of Attention→Foreclosure of Rivals→Reduced ChoiceMarket\ Power \rightarrow Control\ of\ Attention \rightarrow Foreclosure\ of\ Rivals \rightarrow Reduced\ Choice

Therefore, attention can become an important transmission mechanism for digital market power.

34. Exam-Oriented Legal Test

When analysing attention as a substitutable economic currency, ask:

Step 1 — Identify the zero-price service

What does the consumer receive without paying money?

Step 2 — Identify the scarce resource

Is the platform competing for:

time;

attention;

engagement;

data?

Step 3 — Identify substitutes

Which alternative services compete for the same attention?

Step 4 — Examine switching

Would users redirect their time if the platform's quality deteriorated?

Step 5 — Examine multi-sided effects

How does user attention affect advertisers or other sides?

Step 6 — Examine market power

Does one firm control a substantial share of relevant attention?

Step 7 — Examine exclusionary conduct

Has the firm used:

tying;

exclusivity;

self-preferencing;

defaults;

interoperability restrictions;

anti-steering;

data restrictions?

Step 8 — Examine competitive effects

Has conduct reduced:

choice;

quality;

innovation;

privacy;

access;

rival attention?

35. Key Legal Principle

The strongest way to express the doctrine is:

In digital markets, attention can function as a scarce economic resource through which firms compete, particularly where monetary prices are zero. Attention-based substitutability may therefore supplement traditional antitrust market-definition and effects analysis, but it does not automatically replace conventional relevant-market principles.

36. Advantages

Advantages of attention analysis

Works better in zero-price markets.

Recognizes time as scarce.

Captures quality competition.

Helps analyse advertising platforms.

Recognizes digital multi-sided markets.

Helps explain network effects.

Captures algorithmic allocation of visibility.

Can reveal competitive effects missed by price-only analysis.

37. Criticisms

Attention is difficult to quantify.

One minute of attention is not equivalent across products.

Functional substitutability may be weak.

Attention share is not necessarily market share.

Multi-homing complicates measurement.

Privacy concerns arise from measurement.

The concept lacks a universally established legal test.

Excessive reliance could make relevant markets artificially broad.

38. Short Hypothetical

Assume Platform A has 70% of users' relevant short-video attention.

It begins increasing advertisements and reducing content quality.

Users start moving to Platform B.

If evidence shows:

A's quality ↓

→ A's attention ↓

→ B's attention ↑

then B may constitute an important competitive constraint.

Now suppose A blocks B from appearing in its recommendation system.

The analysis becomes:

Attention dominance + recommendation control + foreclosure

This could provide a stronger basis for examining potential exclusionary conduct.

39. Important Distinction

These concepts are related but not interchangeable.

40. Conclusion

Attention as a substitutable economic currency provides a useful framework for analysing digital competition, especially where platforms provide services at zero monetary prices.

The central economic chain is:

Limited user time → competition for attention → engagement → data/advertising value → revenue → market power.

Cases such as Google Android, Google Shopping, FTC v Meta, Ohio v American Express, Epic Games v Apple, Microsoft and United Brands demonstrate different components of this analysis: zero-price digital services, platform economics, substitutability, two-sided markets, distribution control, interoperability and exclusionary conduct.

However, attention should be treated as a supplementary economic lens, not as an automatic replacement for conventional antitrust market-definition principles.

Ultra-short revision

Zero price → scarce attention → substitutability → time spent → engagement → data → advertising → network effects → market power → foreclosure → quality/choice effects.

Key cases:
United Brands → Microsoft → Google Shopping → Google Android → Ohio v American Express → Epic Games v Apple → FTC v Meta → Google Adtech.