1. Meaning and Concept

Overlapping governance bodies performing identical functions refers to a situation in which two or more public authorities, regulators, ministries, commissions, municipalities, system operators, or other institutional bodies possess substantially similar powers over the same energy activity, market, infrastructure, or regulated entity.

The problem is not merely that several institutions participate in energy governance. Energy systems naturally require multiple institutions. The legal difficulty arises when their mandates are duplicative rather than complementary, so that substantially the same function is performed by different bodies.

For example, two authorities may both claim responsibility for:

• granting electricity-related licences;
• fixing or approving tariffs;
• regulating energy procurement;
• supervising grid operators;
• investigating the same regulatory violations;
• issuing technical standards;
• approving renewable-energy projects;
• monitoring environmental compliance; or
• enforcing consumer-protection requirements.

Such overlap can create jurisdictional conflict, contradictory orders, duplicated compliance costs, regulatory uncertainty and delays in decision-making.

2. Why Institutional Overlap Occurs

Overlapping governance bodies commonly emerge because energy regulation develops incrementally.

A. Layered legislation

A new statute may establish a specialised regulator without expressly removing powers granted to an older authority.

B. Federal or decentralised governance

In countries such as India, both central and state institutions may exercise powers over different aspects of the electricity sector.

C. Functional fragmentation

Different institutions may regulate economic, technical, environmental and consumer aspects of the same project. Problems arise where these functions are not clearly separated.

D. Regulatory transition

When electricity markets move from state-controlled monopolies toward competitive markets, older governmental institutions may retain powers that overlap with newly created independent regulators.

E. Emergency powers

During energy crises, governments sometimes acquire temporary powers that overlap with ordinary regulatory functions.

3. Legal Problems Created by Identical Institutional Functions

3.1 Jurisdictional conflict

The most immediate problem is uncertainty about which institution has the final authority.

Suppose Authority A and Authority B both have statutory powers to regulate electricity tariffs. A generator may receive one order from A and a contradictory order from B.

The regulated entity then faces a fundamental legal question:

Which decision must legally be obeyed?

This can produce extensive litigation.

3.2 Conflicting regulatory decisions

Two institutions performing essentially the same function may reach different conclusions on identical facts.

For example:

• Regulator A approves a tariff increase.
• Authority B rejects the same increase.
• The ministry issues another direction concerning the tariff.

The resulting uncertainty undermines predictability in the electricity market.

3.3 Duplication of compliance

Where multiple bodies impose substantially identical reporting requirements, an energy company may have to:

1. submit the same technical information to Authority A;
2. submit it again to Authority B;
3. undergo separate inspections; and
4. respond to parallel proceedings.

This increases administrative costs without necessarily improving regulatory outcomes.

3.4 Delay in infrastructure development

Energy projects frequently require multiple approvals.

Where several bodies exercise overlapping powers, a project may become trapped in sequential or parallel approval processes.

This is particularly significant for:

• transmission lines;
• renewable-energy projects;
• electricity-storage facilities;
• gas pipelines;
• offshore wind;
• hydrogen infrastructure; and
• cross-border energy infrastructure.

Delay itself can become a regulatory problem where legislation requires timely development of essential infrastructure.

4. Constitutional and Administrative Law Dimension

The principle of legality requires public authorities to exercise only those powers legally conferred upon them.

Where two institutions claim the same jurisdiction, courts generally examine:

• the enabling legislation;
• the statutory purpose of each institution;
• the allocation of powers;
• whether one statute is more specific;
• whether one institution is superior within the statutory hierarchy;
• whether delegated legislation is consistent with the parent statute; and
• whether the exercise of power is arbitrary or unreasonable.

The doctrine of ultra vires becomes particularly important.

If Authority B exercises a power that Parliament assigned exclusively to Authority A, its action may be challenged as being beyond jurisdiction.

5. Indian Energy-Law Context

India provides an important example because electricity governance involves several institutional levels.

The Electricity Act 2003 created a framework involving institutions including:

• the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC);
• State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs);
• the Central Electricity Authority (CEA);
• State electricity departments;
• distribution licensees;
• transmission utilities;
• system operators; and
• appellate institutions.

These bodies do not all perform identical functions, but potential institutional overlap can arise where their statutory responsibilities intersect.

The legislative objective is therefore not simply to create more authorities but to allocate functions clearly among them.

6. Important Indian Case Laws

6.1 PTC India Ltd. v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (2010)

Citation: (2010) 4 SCC 603

This is one of the most important Supreme Court decisions concerning the institutional authority of CERC.

The case concerned the relationship between regulations made by CERC and contractual/regulatory arrangements in the electricity sector.

The Supreme Court examined the statutory scheme of the Electricity Act and recognised the importance of understanding the precise source and limits of a regulator's powers.

Relevance

The case illustrates a central principle for overlapping governance:

A specialised regulator cannot simply assume every power connected with its sector; its authority must be located within the statutory framework.

This is particularly important where another institution claims authority over the same subject matter.

6.2 Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised the specialised jurisdiction assigned to electricity regulatory commissions under the Electricity Act.

The case law demonstrates that when Parliament creates a specialised regulatory forum for disputes arising from electricity-sector functions, ordinary institutional mechanisms should not unnecessarily duplicate that jurisdiction.

Significance

Specialised jurisdiction helps prevent:

• parallel proceedings;
• conflicting decisions;
• fragmented regulatory interpretation; and
• forum shopping.

6.3 Energy Watchdog v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (2017)

Citation: (2017) 14 SCC 80

This is an important Supreme Court decision concerning regulatory powers under the Electricity Act, particularly in relation to power-purchase agreements and changes affecting electricity generation.

The Court considered the statutory framework governing CERC's regulatory jurisdiction.

Relevance to overlapping governance

The decision demonstrates that regulatory intervention must remain connected to the powers conferred by legislation.

Where different governmental institutions claim regulatory authority over contractual or tariff-related matters, the statutory allocation of jurisdiction becomes decisive.

6.4 BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd. v. Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission

The Supreme Court's electricity jurisprudence has consistently treated electricity commissions as specialised statutory regulators whose powers arise from the Electricity Act.

The broader principle is that institutional responsibilities should be interpreted according to the statutory architecture rather than by allowing multiple authorities to exercise general regulatory power simultaneously.

7. Comparative Case Law

7.1 R (British Telecommunications plc) v. Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport — United Kingdom

The UK's regulatory framework provides useful comparative material because sectoral regulation can involve ministers, regulators and competition authorities.

The broader administrative-law principle is that institutional powers must be exercised consistently with their statutory allocation.

This becomes especially relevant when economic regulation and competition regulation overlap.

Energy markets often face a similar issue because a single conduct may have:

• energy-regulatory consequences;
• competition-law consequences;
• consumer-protection consequences; and
• environmental consequences.

The answer is not necessarily to eliminate one institution, but to establish clear boundaries and coordination mechanisms.

8. Overlap Versus Complementarity

It is important to distinguish overlap from legitimate multi-institutional governance.

Legitimate complementarity

For example:

Energy regulator → tariff and market regulation
Environmental authority → environmental impacts
System operator → real-time grid operation
Competition authority → anti-competitive conduct

These institutions address different dimensions of the same activity.

Dysfunctional duplication

By contrast:

Authority A → approves electricity tariffs
Authority B → also approves the same tariffs
Authority C → can modify the same tariff decision

Here the institutions perform substantially identical functions.

The latter structure increases the possibility of institutional conflict.

9. Principles for Resolving Overlapping Jurisdiction

Several legal principles can reduce duplication.

9.1 Lex specialis

A specific statutory provision may prevail over a general one.

9.2 Harmonious construction

Courts generally attempt to interpret statutes so that apparently overlapping provisions operate together rather than rendering one provision meaningless.

9.3 Institutional hierarchy

Where legislation establishes an appellate or supervisory hierarchy, lower authorities should not exercise powers inconsistent with that structure.

9.4 Exclusive jurisdiction

Legislation may expressly allocate particular matters to one regulator.

9.5 Concurrent jurisdiction with coordination

Sometimes concurrent jurisdiction is intentional. In that case, legislation should provide mechanisms for:

• consultation;
• information sharing;
• joint proceedings;
• referral;
• lead-regulator designation; and
• dispute resolution.

10. Consequences for Energy Governance

Overlapping governance bodies can produce a regulatory paradox.

More institutions may initially appear to provide more oversight. However, if their functions are identical, additional institutions can reduce rather than increase regulatory effectiveness.

The consequences may include:

The most serious consequence is sometimes accountability diffusion. When several bodies possess essentially the same authority, each can attribute failure to another institution.

11. Judicial Review as a Corrective Mechanism

Courts can address institutional overlap through judicial review.

A court may ask:

1. Who possesses the statutory power?
2. What is the precise scope of that power?
3. Is the authority exercising another body's function?
4. Has the correct procedure been followed?
5. Are competing statutory provisions capable of harmonious interpretation?
6. Has the authority acted for the statutory purpose?

The judicial objective is generally not to redesign the entire regulatory system but to ensure that each authority operates within its lawful institutional boundaries.

12. Future Energy Systems

The issue is becoming more important as energy systems become increasingly complex.

Future regulation may involve separate institutions dealing with:

• electricity;
• hydrogen;
• carbon markets;
• energy storage;
• artificial intelligence;
• digital grids;
• distributed energy resources;
• electric vehicles;
• demand response; and
• energy-data governance.

A single digital energy platform could therefore fall within the jurisdiction of several regulators.

If each regulator performs substantially the same function, institutional overlap may become a significant barrier to energy-system innovation.

13. Recommended Legal Design

A well-designed energy governance system should establish a functional allocation matrix.

For every institution, legislation should identify:

Power → Subject matter → Geographic scope → Regulated entities → Procedure → Enforcement power → Appeal route

For example:

CERC → inter-State electricity regulation → specified statutory matters → generators/licensees → regulatory procedure → statutory enforcement → APTEL/Supreme Court pathway as applicable.

Such clarity reduces jurisdictional disputes.

14. Conclusion

Overlapping governance bodies performing identical functions represent a structural problem of institutional design in energy law. Multiple institutions are not inherently problematic; modern energy systems necessarily require economic, technical, environmental and consumer regulation.

The legal difficulty arises when those institutions possess substantially indistinguishable mandates over the same subject matter.

Indian electricity jurisprudence, particularly decisions such as PTC India Ltd. v. CERC and Energy Watchdog v. CERC, demonstrates the importance of identifying the statutory source, purpose and limits of regulatory authority.

The appropriate solution is therefore not simply to reduce the number of institutions. It is to establish clear jurisdictional boundaries, specialised mandates, coordination mechanisms, hierarchical rules and effective appellate structures. This produces greater legal certainty, reduces duplication and strengthens accountability while preserving the specialised expertise required for modern energy governance.