1. Introduction

Global university-ranking systems—such as international league tables, reputation rankings, research rankings, employability rankings, and subject-specific rankings—have become an important form of information infrastructure in the higher-education market.

Although rankings generally do not constitute universities' commercial competitors in the conventional sense, they can significantly influence:

• student applications and enrolment;
• international student flows;
• tuition revenue;
• government funding;
• research partnerships;
• faculty recruitment;
• institutional reputation;
• philanthropic donations;
• cross-border university expansion; and
• merger, affiliation and strategic decisions.

From a competition-law perspective, the important question is therefore not merely whether a ranking is "accurate." It is whether ranking methodologies, data-access rules, reputation surveys, algorithmic scoring, exclusivity arrangements, or manipulation of ranking inputs can distort competition between higher-education institutions.

The central issue is:

Can control over information about universities become a source of market power capable of distorting competition in higher education?

The answer can be yes, particularly where ranking information becomes an important intermediary between universities and students.

2. Nature of the Higher-Education Ranking Market

The global higher-education ranking ecosystem contains several different markets.

A. University-ranking publishers

Organizations compile and publish rankings using combinations of:

• academic reputation;
• employer reputation;
• citations;
• research output;
• international faculty;
• international students;
• student-faculty ratios;
• graduate employment;
• research income;
• sustainability indicators; and
• proprietary reputation surveys.

B. Data providers

Ranking organizations increasingly depend upon:

• bibliometric databases;
• citation databases;
• publication databases;
• employment data;
• institutional statistics;
• survey responses; and
• university-submitted information.

C. Universities

Universities compete for:

• domestic students;
• international students;
• researchers;
• faculty;
• research funding;
• government grants;
• corporate partnerships; and
• prestige.

D. Students and employers

Students use rankings as a search and quality-discovery mechanism, while employers may use them as an informal signal of educational quality.

This creates a potentially powerful intermediary position for ranking providers.

3. Why Rankings Can Distort Competition

3.1 Information asymmetry

Higher education is characterized by substantial information asymmetry.

A prospective student may find it difficult to compare hundreds of universities across countries.

A ranking converts complex information into a relatively simple number:

University A — 37
University B — 61
University C — 104

The numerical ordering can therefore affect consumer choice disproportionately.

3.2 Rankings can become a quality signal

Suppose students believe:

Higher rank = higher educational quality.

Universities then have an incentive to optimize the indicators used by the ranking system.

This can generate ranking-oriented competition rather than education-oriented competition.

For example, a university might prioritize:

• publications rather than teaching;
• international recruitment rather than local access;
• citation-producing disciplines rather than socially important disciplines;
• faculty ratios rather than actual teaching quality; or
• reputation-building expenditure rather than lower tuition.

4. Competition-Law Framework

Several areas of competition law may become relevant.

Article 101 TFEU / equivalent cartel provisions

Potential problems include agreements between universities concerning:

• coordinated ranking strategies;
• manipulation of ranking data;
• collective exclusion of ranking providers;
• agreements not to participate in particular rankings;
• coordinated publication or research strategies designed to affect rankings.

Article 102 TFEU / abuse of dominance

A dominant ranking or data provider could potentially raise concerns through:

• discriminatory access to ranking data;
• exclusionary contractual conditions;
• self-preferencing;
• tying ranking services to other products;
• refusal to provide essential information;
• manipulation of ranking algorithms;
• discriminatory treatment of universities; or
• exploitative commercial terms.

Merger control

Concentrations involving:

• ranking organizations;
• bibliometric databases;
• academic publishing companies;
• citation databases;
• education-search platforms; and
• student-recruitment platforms

may create information-infrastructure concentration.

5. The Relevant Market Problem

Defining the market is particularly difficult.

Possible relevant markets include:

1. global university rankings;
2. higher-education information services;
3. academic data and bibliometric services;
4. student university-search platforms;
5. international student recruitment;
6. higher-education reputation services; or
7. broader digital education-information markets.

A ranking provider may have limited power if universities can easily switch to alternative rankings.

However, market power becomes more plausible where a ranking has:

• strong brand recognition;
• historical prestige;
• network effects;
• extensive university participation;
• proprietary data;
• high switching costs; and
• influence over students, employers and governments.

6. Network Effects

Ranking systems can exhibit powerful two-sided or multi-sided network effects.

More universities participate → more data become available.

More data → rankings become more credible.

More credibility → more students use rankings.

More students → universities have greater incentives to participate.

More universities → rankings become even more comprehensive.

This creates a reinforcing cycle:

Universities → Data → Ranking → Students → Reputation → Universities

A successful ranking can therefore develop characteristics resembling a digital platform.

7. Reputation as a Competition Variable

Reputation is particularly important.

A university's position may affect:

• application numbers;
• admission selectivity;
• tuition pricing;
• international demand;
• alumni donations;
• research partnerships.

A small ranking change can therefore have significant competitive consequences.

For example:

Rank 48 → Rank 52

may appear insignificant mathematically, but crossing a psychological threshold such as the "top 50" can materially affect consumer perception.

This creates an important competition-law issue:

Does algorithmic ranking constitute a commercially neutral information service, or does it actively structure competition among universities?

8. Case Law

The following cases do not all concern university rankings directly. Many concern information markets, platform power, discriminatory access, standardization, professional associations, education, and digital intermediaries. Their principles can be applied to ranking-system disputes.

Case 1: IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v Commission

CJEU, Case C-418/01, 2004

Facts

IMS Health controlled an important pharmaceutical data structure used by pharmaceutical companies.

A competitor sought access to the structure, and the dispute raised the question whether refusal to provide access to an important information infrastructure could constitute an abuse of dominance.

Principle

The Court established stringent conditions for applying the refusal-to-supply doctrine, particularly where the input is indispensable.

Relevance to university rankings

Suppose a ranking organization controlled a dataset that was effectively indispensable for competing ranking services.

If competitors genuinely could not reproduce the ranking without access to that information, a refusal to provide access could potentially raise essential-facility-type concerns.

The analogy is strongest where:

• the data are indispensable;
• duplication is practically impossible;
• access is necessary to compete; and
• exclusion substantially harms competition.

Competition lesson

Control over critical information infrastructure can become a source of market power.

9. Bronner v Mediaprint

Case 2: Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint

CJEU, Case C-7/97, 1998

Facts

A newspaper publisher sought access to a dominant newspaper-distribution system.

The Court rejected the claim because the distribution system was not shown to be indispensable and alternative solutions were possible.

Relevance

The case provides an important limitation.

A ranking provider should not automatically be required to provide its:

• methodology;
• database;
• algorithms;
• proprietary rankings; or
• commercial services

simply because universities or competitors consider them useful.

Competition lesson

Useful information is not necessarily an indispensable facility.

This is critical in ranking disputes.

10. Microsoft

Case 3: Microsoft Corp. v Commission

General Court, Case T-201/04, 2007

Facts

The European Commission found that Microsoft had abused its dominant position by restricting interoperability information and tying products.

Principle

The case illustrates how control over an important technological interface can allow a dominant company to extend its power into adjacent markets.

Application to ranking systems

Imagine a company controlling:

• university rankings;
• student search;
• application platforms;
• admissions analytics; and
• education advertising.

If it used its ranking position to advantage its own downstream student-recruitment service, this could create a leveraging/self-preferencing theory.

For example:

"Universities receiving premium recruitment services receive enhanced visibility in search and ranking products."

Such conduct could distort competition if the provider has substantial market power.

Competition lesson

Information-platform dominance can be leveraged into adjacent markets.

11. Google Search (Shopping)

Case 4: Google Search (Shopping)

CJEU, Case C-48/22 P, 2024

Facts

The case concerned Google's treatment of its comparison-shopping service within general search results.

The European Commission found that Google had abused its dominant position by favouring its own comparison-shopping service.

Relevance

The case is highly relevant to ranking platforms because ranking systems can similarly determine visibility and ordering.

Consider a hypothetical education platform that:

1. ranks universities;
2. operates student-search services; and
3. earns revenue from universities.

If the platform systematically gives commercially preferred universities better visibility while presenting the rankings as neutral, competition concerns may arise.

Competition lesson

Control over ranking or visibility can itself become a competitive advantage when exercised by a dominant platform.

12. MOTOE

Case 5: MOTOE v Elliniko Dimosio

CJEU, Case C-49/07, 2008

Facts

A Greek organization was involved both in regulating motorcycling events and in commercial activity relating to those events.

The Court considered the competitive implications of combining regulatory and commercial functions.

Relevance to higher education

The analogy is important where a ranking organization simultaneously:

• establishes ranking criteria;
• collects university data;
• evaluates universities;
• sells consultancy services to universities; and
• provides promotional services.

This creates a potential conflict of interest.

A ranking provider could theoretically influence the criteria used to evaluate institutions while commercially selling services designed to improve their ranking.

Competition lesson

Combining rule-setting, evaluation and commercial functions can create structural competition concerns.

13. Wouters

Case 6: Wouters and Others v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandsche Orde van Advocaten

CJEU, Case C-309/99, 2002

Facts

The case concerned professional rules adopted by the Dutch Bar.

The Court examined whether rules restricting competition could nevertheless be justified when genuinely connected with legitimate professional objectives.

Relevance

Universities and ranking organizations may argue that certain restrictions are necessary to preserve:

• academic integrity;
• ranking reliability;
• methodological consistency;
• research quality; or
• prevention of gaming.

Competition law therefore cannot simply invalidate every rule that limits competitive behaviour.

Competition lesson

Restrictive arrangements may sometimes be justified when genuinely necessary and proportionate to legitimate objectives.

14. Meca-Medina

Case 7: Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission

CJEU, Case C-519/04 P, 2006

Facts

The case concerned anti-doping rules in sport.

The Court recognized that rules adopted by sporting organizations could fall within competition law even when presented as regulatory rules.

Relevance

This is useful for ranking systems because ranking methodologies may similarly be described as:

"academic standards rather than commercial rules."

But the label is not decisive.

If ranking rules have significant effects on economic competition among universities, competition law may become relevant.

Competition lesson

Regulatory-looking rules can still have competition-law consequences when they affect economic activity.

15. European Super League

Case 8: European Superleague Company v FIFA and UEFA

CJEU, Case C-680/21, 2023

Facts

The Court considered rules under which FIFA and UEFA controlled authorization of competing football competitions while also having economic interests in existing competitions.

Principle

The Court emphasized the need for transparent, objective, non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria where a body exercises regulatory and economic functions capable of affecting market access.

Relevance

This principle has a strong analogy to global rankings.

A ranking organization that:

• controls access to a prestigious ranking;
• determines participation rules;
• controls evaluation criteria; and
• commercially exploits the resulting reputation

may need particularly transparent governance where its decisions materially affect market access.

Competition lesson

A private organization exercising substantial gatekeeping power over market participation may face heightened competition scrutiny.

16. How Ranking Manipulation Can Occur

Ranking systems create incentives for universities to optimize measurable indicators.

Potential strategies include:

A. Citation optimization

Universities may encourage research designed to maximize citations rather than educational or social value.

B. Faculty restructuring

Universities may recruit highly cited researchers primarily to improve rankings.

C. Internationalization engineering

Institutions may increase international faculty or students because those variables carry significant ranking weight.

D. Reputation campaigns

Universities may invest heavily in international reputation-building.

E. Data engineering

Institutions may restructure reporting practices to maximize ranking indicators.

F. Strategic publication

Researchers may alter publication strategies toward disciplines and journals with greater ranking effects.

17. The "Gaming" Problem

Once universities know the ranking formula, they can optimize against it.

This produces a phenomenon analogous to Goodhart's Law:

When a measure becomes a target, it can cease to be a good measure.

For example:

Ranking metric → institutional response → metric optimization → distorted underlying behaviour

Consequently, ranking systems can unintentionally create a feedback loop.

18. Algorithmic Ranking and Black-Box Decision-Making

Modern rankings increasingly involve complex computational methodologies.

Potential problems include:

• opaque weighting;
• hidden variables;
• machine-learning models;
• changing methodologies;
• undisclosed normalization;
• data-quality problems;
• incomplete university reporting;
• regional biases;
• discipline biases; and
• unstable rankings.

A university may therefore be unable to determine why it moved:

#73 → #112

even when its underlying performance changed little.

This creates concerns about procedural fairness and contestability.

19. Bias Against Certain Universities

Global rankings may systematically advantage universities possessing:

• large research budgets;
• extensive English-language publication output;
• established international reputations;
• large research faculties;
• strong citation networks;
• substantial international student populations.

Smaller institutions may consequently face structural disadvantages.

This can create a competition problem without requiring deliberate discrimination.

The issue becomes:

Can a ranking methodology systematically reproduce existing market concentration?

20. Concentration and the Matthew Effect

Ranking systems can generate a "rich-get-richer" dynamic.

Higher ranking:

→ greater student demand
→ greater tuition revenue
→ stronger research funding
→ better faculty recruitment
→ more publications
→ more citations
→ stronger reputation
→ higher ranking.

Thus:

Ranking advantage → resource advantage → ranking advantage

can become a self-reinforcing cycle.

This is particularly significant in global higher education because reputational capital is difficult for new institutions to replicate.

21. Ranking Systems as Gatekeepers

A ranking provider can potentially become a gatekeeper of reputation.

The economic structure resembles:

Universities
↓
Ranking platform
↓
Students / employers / governments
↓
Funding and enrolment

The ranking platform does not necessarily sell the underlying educational product.

Instead, it controls visibility and information about the product.

This makes ranking markets conceptually similar to:

• search engines;
• review platforms;
• app stores;
• credit-rating systems; and
• comparison-shopping services.

22. Self-Preferencing Risks

Suppose a ranking organization operates a university-search platform.

It might have an incentive to:

• rank partner universities more prominently;
• provide additional visibility to paying institutions;
• recommend universities purchasing advertising;
• bury non-paying universities;
• bundle ranking improvements with consultancy;
• manipulate search and ranking simultaneously.

This creates a potential conflict between:

editorial neutrality and commercial incentives.

23. Pay-to-Play Concerns

One of the most sensitive competition issues is whether universities can effectively purchase preferential treatment.

Potential practices could include:

• paid ranking consultancy;
• premium ranking placement;
• sponsored visibility;
• preferential student recommendations;
• exclusive data services;
• paid institutional profiles.

Not every such practice is unlawful.

The competition concern becomes stronger where:

1. the provider is dominant;
2. the ranking is commercially significant;
3. paid treatment is disguised as independent evaluation; and
4. non-paying universities are disadvantaged.

24. Collective Action by Universities

Universities themselves may also create competition concerns.

Suppose leading universities agree:

"We will collectively refuse to participate in Ranking X."

This could potentially constitute coordinated conduct if its purpose or effect is to:

• exclude a ranking provider;
• suppress information;
• protect incumbent institutions; or
• prevent entry by competing universities.

The precise analysis would depend upon the agreement, objectives and market effects.

25. Ranking Providers and Academic Publishing

The strongest structural concern may arise where one corporate group controls:

• academic journals;
• citation databases;
• research analytics;
• university rankings;
• researcher profiles; and
• education-search services.

This creates a vertically integrated information ecosystem.

For example:

Journal publishing → citation database → university analytics → ranking → student search

A company controlling several stages could potentially obtain significant informational advantages.

26. Merger-Control Implications

A merger between a major ranking organization and an academic-data provider could raise concerns about:

Vertical foreclosure

Competitors may be denied access to essential data.

Input foreclosure

A ranking competitor might be unable to obtain comparable bibliometric information.

Customer foreclosure

Universities might be pressured into using a single integrated ecosystem.

Data concentration

The merged entity could accumulate an unusually comprehensive database concerning universities, researchers and students.

27. International Competition-Law Dimension

Because rankings are global, different jurisdictions may approach the same conduct differently.

Relevant regimes could include:

• EU competition law;
• UK competition law;
• US antitrust law;
• Indian competition law;
• Australian competition law;
• Chinese competition law; and
• national higher-education regulation.

This creates a multi-jurisdictional governance problem.

A ranking methodology accepted in one jurisdiction might be challenged elsewhere because of:

• discrimination;
• transparency;
• data practices;
• dominance;
• consumer protection; or
• market-access effects.

28. Indian Competition-Law Perspective

In India, the Competition Act, 2002 provides a useful framework.

Potential provisions include:

Section 3

Agreements between universities or ranking organizations that appreciably restrict competition could be scrutinized.

Section 4

A dominant ranking/data platform could potentially face scrutiny for:

• discriminatory conditions;
• denial of market access;
• unfair conditions;
• tying;
• leveraging;
• exclusionary conduct.

Sections 5 and 6

Mergers involving education-information platforms and data providers could potentially raise combination concerns where statutory thresholds and competitive effects are satisfied.

The CCI would nevertheless need to establish the relevant market, dominance where required, and an appreciable adverse effect or abuse rather than simply showing that a ranking is controversial.

29. US Antitrust Perspective

US analysis could involve:

• Section 1 Sherman Act;
• Section 2 Sherman Act;
• Clayton Act merger provisions;
• FTC Act §5 in appropriate circumstances.

Potential theories include:

• collusion between universities;
• monopolization;
• exclusionary conduct;
• tying;
• vertical foreclosure;
• discriminatory platform access;
• anticompetitive mergers.

However, courts would generally distinguish competition harm from ordinary commercial disagreement or criticism of a ranking methodology.

30. Consumer-Welfare Problem

There is also an important debate over whether ranking distortion should be treated as a competition problem at all.

A traditional consumer-welfare approach might ask:

Do ranking practices increase prices, reduce quality, reduce output or restrict student choice?

A broader structural approach might additionally ask:

• Does ranking concentration reinforce incumbent universities?
• Does it suppress institutional diversity?
• Does it distort research priorities?
• Does it disadvantage new entrants?
• Does it concentrate reputational power?

This makes rankings a particularly interesting post-price competition issue.

31. Remedies

Competition authorities could consider several remedies.

1. Transparency

Require disclosure of:

• ranking methodology;
• weighting systems;
• major data sources;
• methodology changes.

2. Non-discrimination

Require comparable universities to receive comparable treatment.

3. Data-access remedies

Where legally justified, facilitate access to important datasets.

4. Separation of functions

Separate:

• ranking;
• consultancy;
• advertising; and
• university recruitment.

5. Algorithmic auditing

Independent auditing could examine:

• systematic bias;
• unexplained ranking changes;
• data manipulation;
• algorithmic discrimination.

6. Merger remedies

Structural or behavioural remedies may be appropriate where consolidation threatens competing information services.

32. Limits of Competition Law

Competition law should not become a mechanism for forcing every ranking organization to adopt a particular academic philosophy.

A ranking provider ordinarily has legitimate freedom to decide:

• what it measures;
• how it weights indicators;
• whether it changes methodology;
• whether it publishes rankings;
• how it protects proprietary information.

Competition law becomes relevant principally when market power plus anticompetitive conduct produces identifiable competitive harm.

33. Key Doctrinal Principles from the Cases

34. Overall Competition-Law Test

A useful analytical framework is:

Step 1 — Identify the market

What exactly is being supplied?

Step 2 — Identify market power

Does the ranking provider possess substantial influence?

Step 3 — Identify the mechanism

Is the concern:

• ranking manipulation?
• discriminatory access?
• self-preferencing?
• data foreclosure?
• tying?
• exclusivity?
• collusion?
• algorithmic discrimination?

Step 4 — Establish competitive effects

Does the conduct affect:

• student choice?
• university entry?
• tuition?
• research competition?
• faculty competition?
• international mobility?

Step 5 — Consider efficiencies

Could the conduct improve:

• ranking accuracy;
• academic integrity;
• data reliability;
• consumer information?

Step 6 — Proportionality

Is the restriction necessary to achieve the legitimate objective?

35. Hypothetical Example

Assume GlobalRank controls 75% of the internationally recognized university-ranking market.

It also operates a student-application platform.

Universities can purchase a "premium analytics package."

After purchasing it, universities receive:

• enhanced data analysis;
• better placement in student searches;
• additional profile visibility.

Non-paying universities appear lower in search results.

If GlobalRank simultaneously presents its rankings as objective, the conduct could raise concerns about:

1. dominance;
2. self-preferencing;
3. discriminatory treatment;
4. leveraging;
5. tying;
6. misleading commercial practices;
7. foreclosure of competing universities; and
8. distortion of student choice.

The crucial fact would not merely be that GlobalRank charges money.

The critical question would be whether its market power enables it to convert paid commercial relationships into artificial competitive advantages while controlling an important information gateway.

36. Emerging AI Dimension

AI makes the problem considerably more complicated.

Future ranking systems may evaluate:

• research quality;
• teaching outcomes;
• graduate employability;
• institutional reputation;
• student satisfaction;
• research impact.

AI models could generate rankings dynamically.

This creates new risks:

Algorithmic opacity

Universities may not know why their position changed.

Feedback loops

AI learns from historical rankings and reproduces existing reputational advantages.

Data concentration

Large platforms possessing superior educational datasets could obtain a substantial informational advantage.

Automated reputation manipulation

AI-generated citations, publications, reviews or institutional content could distort ranking inputs.

Autonomous ranking optimization

Universities could deploy AI agents specifically designed to maximize ranking scores, producing an arms race.

Thus:

AI ranking → institutional optimization → gaming → distorted data → AI ranking

could become a self-reinforcing cycle.

37. Fundamental Legal Issue

The deeper competition-law problem is therefore not simply:

"Are university rankings accurate?"

It is:

Who controls the information by which higher-education quality is measured, and can that control determine which universities succeed in the market?

When rankings become sufficiently influential, they cease to be merely descriptive.

They can become market-shaping infrastructure.

38. Conclusion

Global ranking systems occupy an increasingly important position between universities and their consumers. Their power derives from information asymmetry, reputation effects, network effects, data concentration and consumer reliance.

Competition law can intervene where ranking infrastructure is used to:

• exclude competitors;
• manipulate market visibility;
• discriminate between universities;
• leverage dominance;
• foreclose access to essential information;
• coordinate anticompetitive conduct;
• facilitate self-preferencing; or
• reinforce concentrated market structures.

The leading cases—IMS Health, Bronner, Microsoft, Google Shopping, MOTOE, Wouters, Meca-Medina and European Super League—provide a useful doctrinal toolkit even though they arose outside the precise context of university rankings.

The emerging regulatory principle can be summarized as:

A ranking system may be privately produced, but once it becomes a critical gateway through which students, employers, governments and funding bodies evaluate universities, its control over information can acquire genuine competitive significance.