Competition Law and Tokenized Asset Marketplaces and Competition

1. Introduction

Tokenized asset marketplaces are digital platforms on which tokenized representations of assets are issued, listed, traded, transferred, or settled. The underlying assets may include securities, real estate, commodities, investment funds, debt instruments, carbon credits, intellectual property, collectibles, or other real-world assets.

A tokenized asset marketplace can perform several functions simultaneously:

• token issuance and listing;
• trading and order matching;
• custody and wallet services;
• settlement;
• payment and stablecoin services;
• market-data provision;
• token lending and staking;
• asset valuation;
• interoperability with other blockchain networks;
• access to decentralized-finance applications.

This creates competition-law problems similar to those found in digital platforms and financial exchanges, but with additional blockchain-specific issues.

A central issue is whether a marketplace that controls liquidity, listings, custody, wallets, transaction data, smart-contract interfaces, or access to blockchain infrastructure can use that position to exclude competing marketplaces.

Importantly, many of the leading crypto cases have been brought under securities, consumer-protection, AML or fraud laws rather than competition law. They are nevertheless useful for understanding the market structure and platform functions relevant to future antitrust analysis. For example, the SEC's Coinbase litigation specifically describes Coinbase as bringing purchasers and sellers of crypto-asset securities together and performing exchange, broker and clearing functions.

2. Meaning of a Tokenized Asset Marketplace

A tokenized asset marketplace can be represented as:

Underlying Asset → Tokenisation → Blockchain/Smart Contract → Marketplace → Wallet/Custody → Trading → Settlement

For competition-law purposes, it is useful to distinguish:

A. Centralized token marketplace

A centralized operator controls:

• admission of tokens;
• trading rules;
• order matching;
• custody;
• fees;
• listing standards;
• access to customers.

Examples include centralized crypto exchanges and regulated digital-asset trading platforms.

B. Decentralized marketplace

A decentralized exchange or protocol may use:

• smart contracts;
• automated market makers;
• decentralized governance;
• liquidity pools;
• blockchain-based settlement.

The absence of a traditional corporate intermediary does not necessarily eliminate competition concerns. Control may instead be exercised through:

• governance tokens;
• developers;
• validators;
• front-end interfaces;
• oracle providers;
• liquidity providers;
• protocol administrators.

C. Hybrid marketplace

Many tokenized-asset businesses combine centralized and decentralized elements.

For example:

Token issuance + centralized custody + blockchain settlement + decentralized secondary trading.

This creates particularly complicated questions about who actually controls the competitive bottleneck.

3. Relevant Competition-Law Framework

The principal competition-law categories are:

3.1 Abuse of dominance

A dominant marketplace may engage in:

• exclusionary listing rules;
• discriminatory access;
• refusal to deal;
• excessive fees;
• tying;
• self-preferencing;
• exclusivity;
• discriminatory API access;
• foreclosure of rival marketplaces.

3.2 Agreements restricting competition

Competitors could potentially coordinate:

• trading fees;
• listing fees;
• token admission;
• liquidity arrangements;
• market-making;
• transaction routing;
• information exchange.

3.3 Merger control

Concentrations involving:

• exchanges;
• token issuers;
• custody providers;
• wallet providers;
• stablecoin operators;
• blockchain infrastructure providers

may create vertical or conglomerate competition concerns.

3.4 Digital-platform competition

Token marketplaces have characteristics of digital platforms:

• network effects;
• multi-sided markets;
• data advantages;
• switching costs;
• interoperability;
• ecosystem effects;
• economies of scale.

4. Relevant Market Definition

Market definition is particularly difficult because tokenized assets can be traded across several technological layers.

Possible relevant markets include:

1. marketplace services for tokenized securities;
2. secondary trading of tokenized real-world assets;
3. crypto-asset exchange services;
4. token custody services;
5. digital-asset wallet services;
6. token listing services;
7. stablecoin settlement services;
8. blockchain-based settlement infrastructure;
9. market-data services;
10. tokenized investment-product distribution.

A regulator may therefore ask whether two platforms are:

competitors at the marketplace level,

or whether they operate in different but vertically connected markets.

5. Network Effects

Network effects are central to tokenized marketplaces.

A simplified structure is:

More Buyers → More Sellers → Greater Liquidity → Better Prices → More Buyers

This can create a feedback loop.

A large marketplace may therefore become difficult for smaller competitors to challenge.

Liquidity network effects

Liquidity is especially important because traders generally prefer markets with:

• narrower spreads;
• deeper order books;
• more counterparties;
• faster execution.

Consequently, a dominant platform may acquire an important competitive advantage simply because other participants are already there.

6. Token Listing as a Competition Issue

A marketplace controls a critical gateway when it decides which tokens can be listed.

Potential concerns arise if a dominant platform:

• refuses to list competing tokens;
• lists its own tokens preferentially;
• imposes discriminatory technical standards;
• charges rivals substantially higher listing fees;
• delays rival token listings;
• requires exclusivity.

For example:

Exchange A controls 70% of trading in a particular class of tokenized securities and owns a tokenized settlement system. It refuses to list tokens issued by competing platforms.

The conduct could potentially amount to exclusionary behavior if dominance and the other legal requirements are established.

7. Self-Preferencing

Self-preferencing occurs where a marketplace gives preferential treatment to its own products or affiliated products.

A token marketplace could:

• place its own tokens at the top of search results;
• provide cheaper trading fees for affiliated tokens;
• provide superior liquidity;
• give affiliated issuers faster listing;
• give its own market-making operation preferential access;
• route orders toward its affiliated liquidity pools.

The concern is particularly significant where the marketplace simultaneously acts as:

platform + issuer + broker + market maker + custodian.

8. Vertical Foreclosure

A tokenized asset ecosystem can contain several vertically connected levels:

Blockchain

↓

Token issuer

↓

Marketplace

↓

Wallet/Custody

↓

Payment/Stablecoin

↓

Investor

If one corporate group controls several layers, it may have incentives to disadvantage competitors operating at one of those levels.

For example:

A dominant marketplace could make its wallet fully interoperable with its own exchange while imposing technical restrictions on competing wallets.

This could increase switching costs and foreclose rival marketplaces.

9. Refusal of Access to Essential Infrastructure

A particularly important question concerns whether certain blockchain or marketplace infrastructure could constitute an essential facility.

Potentially critical facilities include:

• token settlement infrastructure;
• dominant custody systems;
• blockchain access;
• token registries;
• liquidity pools;
• price oracles;
• interoperability gateways;
• dominant wallet infrastructure.

However, not every commercially important infrastructure is an essential facility. Competition authorities generally require demanding legal conditions before imposing compulsory access.

The analysis would normally examine:

1. whether the facility is genuinely indispensable;
2. whether duplication is realistically possible;
3. whether refusal eliminates effective competition;
4. whether objective justification exists;
5. whether access can be technically provided.

10. API Access and Interoperability

APIs can become a major competitive bottleneck.

A dominant marketplace might restrict:

• trading APIs;
• wallet APIs;
• token-transfer APIs;
• market-data APIs;
• settlement APIs;
• blockchain bridges.

A refusal or discriminatory API policy may make it difficult for customers to use competing marketplaces.

This resembles competition issues historically seen in digital platforms where control over an interface allows one undertaking to restrict downstream competitors.

11. Data Advantages

Token marketplaces generate enormous quantities of information:

• transaction histories;
• wallet activity;
• trading volumes;
• liquidity;
• token ownership;
• order-book information;
• investor behavior;
• price movements.

A dominant platform may therefore possess a significant data advantage.

Competition concerns could arise if it:

• withholds commercially important data;
• provides inferior data to rivals;
• uses customer data to compete against customers;
• combines marketplace data with other services;
• uses proprietary data to identify profitable trading opportunities.

12. Tying and Bundling

A marketplace may bundle:

trading + custody + wallet + staking + lending + stablecoin + settlement.

Bundling is not automatically unlawful.

The competition-law question is whether the arrangement:

• involves a dominant undertaking;
• concerns distinct products/services;
• coerces or strongly induces customers to purchase another service;
• forecloses competitors;
• lacks sufficient objective justification.

For example, requiring every token trader to use the marketplace's proprietary wallet could disadvantage independent wallet providers.

13. Exclusive Dealing

Token issuers may be required to:

• list exclusively on one exchange;
• use one custody provider;
• use one settlement system;
• use one liquidity provider.

Exclusivity can produce substantial network effects.

If a large marketplace has substantial market power, exclusivity may prevent smaller exchanges from achieving the liquidity necessary to compete.

14. Interoperability and Blockchain Bridges

Interoperability is one of the most important competition issues.

Suppose Marketplace A supports Token X but refuses to permit Token X to interact with Marketplace B.

The refusal could potentially create:

technical foreclosure → liquidity fragmentation → customer lock-in → reduced competition.

Competition analysis should distinguish legitimate security concerns from exclusionary restrictions.

A marketplace may have legitimate reasons to restrict interoperability where there are:

• security vulnerabilities;
• fraud risks;
• AML concerns;
• smart-contract risks;
• custody risks.

15. Stablecoins and Settlement Competition

Stablecoins can become competitive bottlenecks because they provide settlement liquidity.

A dominant token marketplace might:

• preferentially support its affiliated stablecoin;
• impose higher fees for competing stablecoins;
• prevent users from transferring competing stablecoins;
• offer rebates for trading through its own stablecoin.

This could raise vertical foreclosure and tying concerns.

The competitive significance increases if the marketplace controls both:

trading liquidity + settlement currency.

16. Merger and Acquisition Concerns

Tokenized-asset consolidation can involve:

Horizontal mergers

Exchange + exchange.

Vertical mergers

Exchange + custody provider.

Conglomerate mergers

Exchange + wallet + stablecoin + token issuer.

Ecosystem mergers

Blockchain + exchange + token + wallet.

Authorities may examine:

• market shares;
• liquidity;
• network effects;
• entry barriers;
• data concentration;
• interoperability;
• access to customers;
• token listings;
• cross-market leverage.

17. Six Important Case Laws

Because dedicated antitrust jurisprudence concerning tokenized-asset marketplaces is still developing, the most useful authorities combine digital-platform competition cases with crypto-marketplace litigation.

Case 1 — United States v. American Express Co., 585 U.S. 529 (2018)

Principle

The U.S. Supreme Court treated credit-card networks as two-sided transaction platforms, requiring competitive effects to be considered on both sides of the platform.

Relevance to tokenized marketplaces

This is highly relevant to tokenized-asset platforms because they similarly connect:

• buyers;
• sellers;
• token issuers;
• liquidity providers;
• market makers.

A restriction imposed on one side may affect participation on the other side.

Competition lesson

Market definition cannot necessarily be performed by examining only traders.

A regulator may need to consider the interaction between:

issuers ↔ marketplace ↔ investors ↔ liquidity providers.

Case 2 — Ohio v. American Express Co.

The Supreme Court's reasoning is particularly important for two-sided platforms.

Application

A token marketplace may argue that a restriction increasing costs for one category of users produces benefits elsewhere in the ecosystem.

For example:

Higher issuer fees → increased security infrastructure → greater investor confidence.

The competitive assessment must therefore consider the relevant sides of the platform rather than examining only one transaction in isolation.

Case 3 — FTC v. Facebook, Inc.

The Facebook litigation illustrates the importance of:

• network effects;
• data advantages;
• platform ecosystems;
• exclusionary conduct;
• acquisition of potential competitors.

Application to tokenized marketplaces

A dominant marketplace could potentially acquire:

• competing exchanges;
• emerging decentralized protocols;
• wallet providers;
• liquidity providers;
• token infrastructure companies.

Competition authorities may examine whether acquisitions eliminate emerging competitive threats.

The case is particularly useful for understanding how digital ecosystems can create durable market power.

Case 4 — Google Shopping

The European Commission's Google Shopping decision is relevant to self-preferencing.

Principle

A dominant platform can face competition-law scrutiny when it uses control over an important platform interface to favor its own services over competing services.

Token-marketplace application

A tokenized asset marketplace could potentially favor:

• affiliated tokens;
• affiliated token issuers;
• affiliated liquidity pools;
• affiliated wallets;
• affiliated investment products.

For example:

Search result 1 — platform's own token
Search result 2 — platform affiliate
Search result 20 — competing token

If such treatment is connected with dominance and produces legally relevant foreclosure, competition concerns may arise.

Case 5 — SEC v. Coinbase, Inc. and Coinbase Global, Inc.

This is not an antitrust decision, but it is extremely significant for understanding the economic structure of a crypto marketplace.

The SEC alleged that Coinbase operated functions corresponding to an exchange, broker and clearing agency and that its platform brought together buyers and sellers of crypto-asset securities. In March 2024, the federal district court allowed substantial parts of the SEC's case to proceed at the pleading stage.

Competition relevance

The case demonstrates that one crypto platform may perform several traditionally separate functions:

Marketplace + Broker + Clearing + Custody

This vertical integration can create competition questions concerning:

• conflicts of interest;
• access;
• self-preferencing;
• order routing;
• custody;
• data;
• market-making.

The competition-law question is separate from the securities-law question, but the structural facts are relevant to both.

Case 6 — SEC v. Kraken

The Kraken litigation similarly illustrates the regulatory treatment of crypto trading platforms.

The SEC alleged that Kraken operated as an unregistered exchange, broker, dealer and clearing agency in relation to crypto-asset securities. A federal court declined to dismiss significant portions of the SEC's case at the preliminary stage. The litigation illustrates how a crypto platform can combine multiple functions traditionally associated with separate financial-market intermediaries.

Competition relevance

For antitrust purposes, vertical integration can create questions about:

• preferential execution;
• access to liquidity;
• token admission;
• custody;
• data;
• market-making;
• downstream exclusion.

Case 7 — Underwood v. Coinbase Global, Inc.

In Underwood v. Coinbase Global, Inc., litigation concerning Coinbase's role in digital-asset transactions addressed whether Coinbase was a statutory seller for purposes of securities-law claims.

A July 2026 decision distinguished between matched transactions and transactions where Coinbase filled orders from its own inventory, finding Coinbase was not a statutory seller with respect to the matched transactions at issue.

Competition relevance

The distinction is useful because competition law may similarly need to determine whether a platform is merely:

neutral infrastructure

or is itself:

an active participant in the market.

If a marketplace both operates the exchange and trades from its own inventory, potential conflicts involving self-preferencing and access become more significant.

Case 8 — Epic Games v. Apple

Although involving app distribution rather than crypto, the case is important for understanding platform access and payment restrictions.

Tokenized-marketplace analogy

Suppose a dominant digital platform requires tokenized assets to use:

• its wallet;
• its payment rail;
• its custody service;
• its settlement mechanism.

The relevant competition questions can resemble those arising in digital-platform disputes concerning:

• access;
• commissions;
• alternative payment mechanisms;
• platform rules;
• competing distribution channels.

This is particularly relevant if tokenized securities or assets are distributed through a dominant digital ecosystem.

18. Crypto-Specific Competition Risks

The major competition risks can be summarized as follows:

19. Algorithmic Competition

Token marketplaces are particularly susceptible to algorithmic coordination.

Trading algorithms may observe:

• prices;
• volumes;
• spreads;
• order books;
• liquidity;
• competitor behavior.

If algorithms independently respond to public information, that does not automatically establish a cartel.

However, competition concerns become stronger where competing firms:

• intentionally exchange competitively sensitive information;
• coordinate algorithmic parameters;
• agree on pricing algorithms;
• use a common algorithm to coordinate prices;
• deliberately design systems to stabilize prices against competitive pressure.

20. DAO-Based Marketplaces

Decentralized autonomous organizations create a novel competition problem.

Suppose several competing marketplaces are governed by the same DAO or common governance-token holders.

Questions may arise concerning:

• common ownership;
• voting rights;
• coordination;
• information exchange;
• common pricing policies;
• liquidity allocation.

The fact that governance occurs through blockchain voting does not necessarily make the underlying economic coordination irrelevant to competition law.

21. Token-Based Incentives and Rebates

Marketplaces may provide:

• token rewards;
• fee discounts;
• liquidity-mining rewards;
• staking benefits;
• governance tokens.

These mechanisms can promote competition by lowering switching costs.

But a dominant marketplace could also use them strategically.

For example:

“Users receive substantial rewards only if they trade exclusively on our marketplace.”

Depending on the circumstances, such incentives could raise concerns similar to loyalty rebates or exclusivity arrangements.

22. Switching Costs

Token marketplaces can generate substantial switching costs through:

• wallet integration;
• accumulated loyalty rewards;
• transaction history;
• staking;
• governance rights;
• stored assets;
• proprietary APIs;
• custody arrangements.

High switching costs can reinforce an incumbent's market position.

Competition authorities may therefore examine whether users can easily:

• transfer tokens;
• export transaction data;
• move wallets;
• access competing platforms;
• transfer staking positions.

23. Consumer and Small-Competitor Effects

Competition law is concerned primarily with competitive processes, rather than simply protecting individual competitors.

Nevertheless, exclusionary marketplace practices can indirectly affect:

Investors

• higher trading costs;
• fewer choices;
• poorer liquidity.

Token issuers

• higher listing fees;
• restricted access to investors.

Smaller marketplaces

• inability to obtain liquidity;
• exclusion from APIs;
• difficulty accessing settlement systems.

Innovation

• reduced incentives to develop new tokenized products.

24. Regulatory Overlap

Tokenized asset marketplaces may simultaneously fall within several legal regimes:

Competition Law

↓

Securities/Financial-Market Regulation

↓

AML/CFT

↓

Consumer Protection

↓

Data Protection

↓

Cybersecurity

↓

Digital-Platform Regulation

A competition authority therefore needs to distinguish:

conduct that is merely regulatory non-compliance

from:

conduct that actually restricts competition.

For example, a refusal to list a token because of legally mandated investor-protection requirements is different from refusing to list a token solely because it competes with the platform's affiliated token.

25. Remedies

Possible competition remedies include:

Structural remedies

• divestiture;
• separation of exchange and market-making operations;
• separation of custody and trading.

Behavioral remedies

• non-discriminatory listing;
• fair API access;
• interoperability;
• transparent ranking;
• prohibition of exclusivity.

Data remedies

• data portability;
• access to essential market information;
• restrictions on use of competitor-sensitive data.

Governance remedies

• independent governance;
• conflict-of-interest controls;
• separation of voting rights.

Merger remedies

• divestiture of competing assets;
• interoperability commitments;
• access commitments;
• prohibition of discriminatory treatment.

26. Competition-Law Test for Tokenized Asset Marketplaces

A useful analytical framework is:

Step 1 — Identify the asset

What is being tokenized?

• security;
• commodity;
• real estate;
• fund;
• debt;
• carbon credit;
• intellectual property;
• other asset.

Step 2 — Identify the marketplace

Who controls:

• listing;
• trading;
• settlement;
• custody?

Step 3 — Define the relevant market

Consider:

• product substitutability;
• geographic scope;
• liquidity;
• network effects;
• multi-sided characteristics.

Step 4 — Establish market power

Examine:

• market share;
• liquidity;
• user base;
• data;
• network effects;
• entry barriers;
• switching costs.

Step 5 — Identify exclusionary conduct

Look for:

• refusal of access;
• self-preferencing;
• tying;
• exclusivity;
• discriminatory APIs;
• discriminatory fees;
• data foreclosure.

Step 6 — Examine objective justification

Consider:

• cybersecurity;
• AML;
• investor protection;
• technical compatibility;
• fraud prevention.

Step 7 — Assess competitive effects

Ask whether the conduct:

• excludes rivals;
• raises entry barriers;
• reduces liquidity;
• increases costs;
• reduces innovation;
• harms consumer choice.

Step 8 — Consider remedies

Determine whether:

• access;
• interoperability;
• behavioral restrictions;
• structural separation

can restore competitive conditions.

27. Special Issue: Tokenized Real-World Assets

Tokenized real-world assets may create new forms of concentration.

For example:

Real Estate Token Platform

→ Token issuance
→ Custody
→ Investor marketplace
→ Secondary trading
→ Valuation data
→ Settlement

If a single undertaking controls all six layers, competitors may find it difficult to enter.

The competition concern is therefore not merely the percentage of token trades conducted by the platform. Control over complementary infrastructure may itself become strategically important.

28. Special Issue: Competition Between Centralized and Decentralized Markets

Tokenization creates an unusual competitive relationship:

Centralized Exchange (CEX) ↔ Decentralized Exchange (DEX)

A centralized marketplace may have advantages in:

• compliance;
• custody;
• customer support;
• fiat access.

A decentralized marketplace may have advantages in:

• permissionless access;
• composability;
• smart-contract settlement;
• interoperability.

Competition law should therefore avoid assuming that these systems are automatically substitutes. Their substitutability must be examined empirically for the relevant asset and customer group.

29. Key Legal Principles from the Case Law

The authorities collectively illustrate several principles:

1. Two-sided platform effects matter — Ohio v. American Express.
2. Network effects can reinforce digital market power — illustrated by major platform antitrust litigation.
3. Self-preferencing can raise competition concerns — Google Shopping.
4. Platform access and payment restrictions can affect downstream competition — Epic Games v. Apple.
5. Crypto marketplaces can combine several market functions — SEC v. Coinbase.
6. Crypto exchanges can operate as vertically integrated financial-market platforms — SEC v. Kraken.
7. The precise economic role of an exchange matters — Underwood v. Coinbase.
8. Crypto technology does not remove ordinary economic competition questions.

30. Conclusion

Tokenized asset marketplaces represent a new form of multi-sided digital financial market. Their competition-law significance arises not simply from token trading but from the possibility that a single platform may control several interconnected layers—listing, trading, liquidity, custody, wallets, settlement, stablecoins, data and governance.

The principal competition risks are:

market concentration + network effects + liquidity advantages + vertical integration + data control + interoperability restrictions.

The most important future competition-law questions will therefore concern whether dominant token marketplaces can exclude competing exchanges, discriminate against rival tokens, restrict interoperability, tie wallets or settlement services, exploit proprietary data, or acquire emerging competitors before they become effective rivals.

At the same time, regulatory requirements concerning securities, AML, cybersecurity and investor protection can provide legitimate justifications for some restrictions. Competition analysis must therefore distinguish legitimate market regulation from exclusionary conduct designed to protect market power.

The emerging jurisprudence suggests that the decisive issue will not be whether an asset is represented by a blockchain token, but how market power is created and exercised within the tokenized-asset ecosystem.