Competition Law and Future Governance of Digital Competition in Denmark

Introduction

Digital competition in Denmark is governed through a multi-layered framework combining Danish competition law, EU competition law, the EU Digital Markets Act (DMA), the Platform-to-Business Regulation (P2B), consumer law, data-protection rules, and sector-specific regulation.

The Danish Competition and Consumer Authority and the Danish Competition Council remain central national institutions. Danish competition law prohibits anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance and provides merger-control powers. At EU level, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and, increasingly, the DMA regulate digital platforms whose economic power extends beyond conventional market structures. The European Commission is the principal DMA enforcer, while Danish authorities continue to enforce national and EU competition rules in appropriate cases.

The future governance problem is therefore not simply whether a digital undertaking is "dominant." It is whether platform architecture, data, algorithms, interoperability, ecosystems, artificial intelligence and network effects allow a firm to control the conditions under which other businesses compete.

I. Legal Framework in Denmark

1. Danish Competition Act

The Danish Competition Act contains the principal domestic competition rules.

Section 6 — Anti-competitive agreements

Section 6 addresses agreements, decisions and concerted practices that restrict competition.

In digital markets, this can include:

• algorithmic coordination;
• information exchange;
• platform parity clauses;
• exclusionary distribution arrangements;
• restrictions on multi-homing;
• coordinated pricing through software;
• agreements concerning access to digital infrastructure.

The important future question is whether apparently independent algorithms are facilitating coordination between competitors without traditional human communication.

2. Section 11 — Abuse of dominance

Section 11 prohibits abuse of a dominant position and corresponds substantially with Article 102 TFEU.

Digital examples include:

• self-preferencing;
• discriminatory access to APIs;
• tying;
• refusal of interoperability;
• exploitative platform terms;
• exclusionary rebates;
• predatory or strategic pricing;
• discriminatory ranking;
• data-access restrictions;
• restrictions on competing payment systems.

The 2026 Wolt decision demonstrates that Danish enforcement can directly address platform-specific commercial conditions.

II. The EU Digital Markets Act and Denmark

The DMA represents a major change in the governance of digital competition.

Instead of waiting until conventional dominance and effects have been established under Article 102, the DMA imposes ex ante obligations on designated gatekeepers.

The Commission has designated Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, ByteDance, Meta, Microsoft and Booking for specified core platform services. Booking became a designated gatekeeper in 2024.

This is particularly important for Denmark because Danish users and businesses participate in the same EU digital markets.

Important DMA obligations include:

1. anti-self-preferencing;
2. anti-steering requirements;
3. interoperability;
4. data portability;
5. restrictions on combining personal data;
6. choice of default services;
7. restrictions on tying ancillary services;
8. restrictions concerning app-store payment systems;
9. access and fairness requirements;
10. obligations relating to gatekeeper acquisitions.

The DMA therefore changes digital competition governance from a predominantly reactive model to a partially preventive model.

III. Major Case Laws

1. Google Shopping — Google and Alphabet v Commission, C-48/22 P (2024)

This is one of the most important cases for future digital competition governance.

The European Commission had found that Google abused its dominant position by favouring its own comparison-shopping service in general search results.

The Court of Justice upheld the essential finding and the €2.4 billion fine.

Principle

A dominant digital platform cannot necessarily rely upon its control over an important gateway to favour its own downstream service in a manner capable of restricting competition.

Importance for Denmark

The case provides an important analytical foundation for:

• search engines;
• digital marketplaces;
• app ecosystems;
• ranking systems;
• recommendation engines;
• AI search;
• platform self-preferencing.

The principle is particularly relevant to future AI-powered search systems where the platform simultaneously controls the infrastructure, ranking algorithm and competing commercial services.

2. Bronner — Oscar Bronner GmbH v Mediaprint, C-7/97

Although predating the modern digital economy, Bronner remains highly relevant to digital infrastructure.

The case concerned access to an essential distribution network.

Principle

A refusal to provide access does not automatically constitute abuse of dominance. The strict conditions associated with an essential-facility/refusal-to-deal theory must be satisfied.

Digital significance

The reasoning becomes relevant to:

• app stores;
• payment infrastructure;
• cloud infrastructure;
• operating systems;
• API access;
• digital identity systems;
• interoperability.

The future challenge is determining when a privately controlled digital infrastructure becomes sufficiently indispensable to justify mandatory access.

3. Google Android — Google and Alphabet v Commission, T-604/18

The Android proceedings concerned Google's contractual arrangements involving Android, Google Search and other services.

The case illustrates how dominance in one digital ecosystem can be leveraged into neighbouring markets.

Competition issues

The analysis involved:

• tying;
• default positioning;
• distribution agreements;
• mobile operating systems;
• search competition;
• network effects.

Future Danish significance

The case provides an important framework for assessing:

ecosystem leverage + defaults + data + network effects

A platform may possess several interconnected competitive advantages rather than a single conventional market advantage.

4. Meta — Danish Competition Council, 24 June 2026

This is a particularly important Danish digital-platform case.

The Danish Competition Council found that Meta had breached the Platform-to-Business Regulation in relation to a Danish clothing business whose Facebook presence was important for marketing and sales.

After the business's account was hacked, the platform did not adequately respond to its requests for restoration. The Danish authority intervened, and Meta ultimately restored access.

Principle

Digital competition governance is not limited to price.

A platform's control over access to a commercially significant digital channel can itself have competitive consequences.

Future significance

The case illustrates the growing importance of:

• platform fairness;
• transparency;
• account suspension;
• access rights;
• business-user protection;
• procedural safeguards.

This is particularly significant for SMEs dependent on platforms for customer acquisition.

5. Wolt Denmark — Danish Competition Council, 26 August 2026

This is one of the most directly relevant contemporary Danish digital competition cases.

The Danish Competition Council found that Wolt had abused its dominant position in the Danish meal-ordering platform market during the relevant period.

The Council identified:

• a price-parity clause;
• exclusionary effects;
• unfair trading conditions;
• effects on restaurants;
• consequences for competing meal-delivery platforms.

The authority stated that Wolt's market share had increased from approximately 50–60% to approximately 70–80% during the investigated 2022–2024 period.

Legal significance

The case demonstrates that a platform can potentially harm competition not only through consumer prices but through contractual control over business users.

The parity mechanism could discourage restaurants from offering lower prices through:

• their own websites;
• competing platforms;
• alternative ordering channels.

Future governance lesson

Digital competition authorities will increasingly examine:

platform → business user → rival platform → consumer

rather than examining only the platform's direct relationship with consumers.

6. Apple App Store — DMA proceedings

The Apple App Store provides another important model for future digital competition regulation.

The DMA requires designated gatekeepers to permit app developers to communicate alternative offers and steer users toward alternatives.

In April 2025, the Commission found Apple in breach of its anti-steering obligation and imposed a €500 million fine.

Competition concern

The underlying issue is the ability of a platform to control:

• distribution;
• payments;
• consumer relationships;
• commissions;
• access to competing commercial channels.

Future Danish significance

The same conceptual problem can arise in:

• app stores;
• digital wallets;
• payment platforms;
• online marketplaces;
• ticketing platforms;
• cloud ecosystems.

7. Meta Consent-or-Pay — DMA, 2025

The Commission also found Meta's "consent or pay" model incompatible with the DMA's requirements concerning personal-data combination and user choice and imposed a €200 million fine.

Competition significance

Data can function as a competitive input.

Consequently, future competition analysis increasingly needs to examine:

• access to data;
• data accumulation;
• cross-platform data combination;
• behavioural data;
• targeted advertising;
• data portability;
• privacy-related competitive parameters.

This demonstrates convergence between competition law, data governance and consumer autonomy.

IV. Core Digital Competition Problems in Denmark

1. Network Effects

Digital platforms frequently become more valuable as more users join.

For example:

More users → more merchants → more data → better service → more users

This feedback loop can make market entry difficult.

Traditional market-share analysis may therefore underestimate the competitive importance of network effects.

2. Data Advantages

Large platforms may possess:

• transaction data;
• behavioural data;
• search data;
• location data;
• advertising data;
• merchant data;
• interoperability data.

The future question is whether accumulated data creates an enduring competitive advantage.

3. Self-Preferencing

Self-preferencing occurs where a platform gives preferential treatment to its own products or services.

Examples may include:

• search ranking;
• marketplace ranking;
• app-store placement;
• travel results;
• advertising systems;
• AI-generated recommendations.

Google Shopping demonstrates why this issue has become central to European digital competition law.

V. Algorithms and Algorithmic Collusion

Future Danish enforcement will increasingly have to distinguish between:

A. Human coordination

Competitors deliberately communicate and coordinate prices.

B. Algorithmic implementation

Competitors independently deploy algorithms that respond to market conditions.

C. Algorithmic facilitation

A common technological intermediary facilitates coordination.

D. Autonomous coordination

AI systems independently develop pricing or strategic behaviour that produces coordinated outcomes.

The last category creates difficult questions about:

• attribution;
• foreseeability;
• intent;
• evidence;
• causation;
• corporate responsibility.

Competition law may therefore increasingly require algorithmic audit trails.

VI. AI and Digital Competition

The development of generative AI and autonomous commercial agents could substantially change Danish competition governance.

Consider an AI purchasing agent that:

1. searches several suppliers;
2. negotiates prices;
3. selects suppliers;
4. changes orders automatically;
5. recommends products;
6. learns from previous transactions.

If a small number of AI intermediaries control access between consumers and businesses, they could become new digital gatekeepers.

Potential competition problems include:

• discriminatory recommendation;
• ranking manipulation;
• self-preferencing;
• exclusion of rivals;
• coordinated pricing;
• discriminatory access to data;
• algorithmic foreclosure.

VII. Interoperability

Interoperability will become one of the central principles of future digital competition.

A platform may make competition difficult by preventing competitors from communicating with its ecosystem.

Relevant areas include:

• messaging;
• payment systems;
• cloud services;
• operating systems;
• smart devices;
• digital identity;
• health-data systems;
• financial APIs.

The DMA expressly addresses interoperability and data portability for designated gatekeepers.

VIII. Digital Mergers in Denmark

Traditional merger control can face difficulties where a target has:

• low turnover;
• valuable data;
• rapidly growing users;
• strategic technology;
• an innovative product;
• substantial future competitive potential.

The concern is the so-called killer-acquisition problem.

Future Danish merger analysis may therefore increasingly consider:

1. Data assets

Does the acquisition combine datasets capable of creating durable market power?

2. Innovation competition

Will a potential future competitor disappear?

3. Ecosystem effects

Will the transaction strengthen an existing digital ecosystem?

4. Multi-market leverage

Can dominance in one digital market be transferred to another?

5. AI capabilities

Does the target possess models, training data, computing resources or intellectual property strategically important to future competition?

IX. Platform-to-Business Regulation

The Danish Meta case illustrates the importance of P2B regulation.

Platform governance increasingly requires:

• transparent terms;
• reasons for suspension;
• complaint mechanisms;
• fair treatment;
• procedural safeguards.

This is particularly important because SMEs can become economically dependent upon a platform without the platform necessarily having conventional monopoly power.

X. Future Institutional Governance

The Danish model is likely to develop through cooperation among:

Danish Competition and Consumer Authority

Competition investigations, merger control, market studies and enforcement.

Danish Competition Council

Decision-making in significant competition matters.

European Commission

Particularly important for DMA enforcement and EU-wide digital gatekeepers.

Courts

Judicial review of competition decisions and development of legal principles.

Data-protection authorities

For competition issues involving personal data and privacy.

Sector regulators

For telecommunications, financial services, energy, media and other regulated digital markets.

This creates a multi-regulator digital competition architecture.

XI. Future Regulatory Model

A future Danish digital competition framework can be understood through the following structure:

Digital Market

↓

Market Power Assessment

↓

Network Effects + Data + Switching Costs + Ecosystem Control

↓

Conduct Assessment

↓

Self-Preferencing / Tying / Parity / Exclusion / Data Restrictions / Algorithmic Coordination

↓

Applicable Regime

→ Danish Competition Act
→ Articles 101/102 TFEU
→ DMA
→ P2B Regulation
→ Consumer/Data Regulation

↓

Remedy

→ Fine
→ Cease-and-desist order
→ Behavioural remedy
→ Interoperability
→ Data access/portability
→ Contract modification
→ Structural remedy where legally justified

XII. Future Governance Priorities

1. Algorithmic transparency

Authorities may increasingly need access to:

• ranking logic;
• pricing algorithms;
• recommendation systems;
• training data;
• audit logs;
• model documentation.

2. Interoperability

Competition authorities may require dominant ecosystems to permit meaningful technical interoperability.

3. Data portability

Users and businesses should be able to move relevant data between competing services.

4. Multi-homing

Regulation should prevent platforms from unnecessarily preventing users or business customers from using competing services.

5. Digital merger surveillance

Acquisition analysis should account for innovation and data rather than relying exclusively on current turnover.

6. AI governance

Competition authorities will need mechanisms for assessing autonomous algorithmic behaviour.

7. SME protection

Small Danish businesses may require protection from unfair contractual dependence upon large digital platforms.

XIII. Key Case-Law Principles — Summary

XIV. Overall Legal Position

The future of Danish digital competition law is moving from a model centred primarily on market definition + dominance + abuse toward a broader system combining:

competition law + ex-ante digital regulation + platform governance + data governance + interoperability + algorithmic accountability.

The most important development is the interaction between Danish enforcement and EU digital regulation. The Wolt decision shows that traditional Danish dominance law remains capable of addressing platform-specific conduct, while the Meta case demonstrates the increasing importance of platform-fairness rules. At EU level, the DMA adds direct obligations for designated gatekeepers, including obligations concerning steering, interoperability, data and user choice.

For Denmark, therefore, future digital competition governance is likely to focus increasingly on gatekeeper power, ecosystem control, data accumulation, algorithmic decision-making, interoperability, platform dependency and AI-driven market structures, rather than solely on conventional price competition.

Conclusion

Denmark's future digital competition regime will be characterized by preventive, technology-sensitive and ecosystem-oriented regulation. Traditional Danish competition law will continue to address cartels, restrictive agreements, abuse of dominance and mergers, while EU-level instruments such as the DMA will address structural problems associated with major digital gatekeepers.

The emerging Wolt and Meta decisions are particularly significant because they demonstrate that digital-platform regulation is no longer merely an abstract European policy issue: platform power, business-user dependence, contractual parity, access and fairness are becoming concrete Danish enforcement issues.

The central future legal question will consequently be:

How can Denmark preserve open, contestable digital markets when the most important competitive resources—data, algorithms, interfaces, ecosystems and AI infrastructure—are increasingly controlled by a small number of technologically powerful undertakings?