Competition Law and Future Challenges for Danish Competition Law

1. Introduction

Danish competition law is increasingly moving from a traditional model—focused mainly on cartels, abuse of dominance and conventional mergers—toward a more complex framework dealing with digital platforms, artificial intelligence, data-driven markets, sustainability, below-threshold acquisitions, algorithmic coordination, network effects and rapidly changing energy markets.

The principal statutory framework is the Danish Competition Act, particularly:

• Section 6 — prohibition of anti-competitive agreements and concerted practices;
• Section 11 — prohibition of abuse of a dominant position;
• Part 4 / Section 12 onwards — merger control;
• Danish rules operate alongside Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and EU merger law where EU law applies. 

A particularly important development is Denmark's new ability, since July 2024, to require notification of certain below-threshold mergers where Danish turnover is at least DKK 50 million and there is a risk of a significant impediment to effective competition.

The future of Danish competition law will therefore involve a shift from simply asking "Is the undertaking dominant?" toward questions such as "How did it acquire its position?", "Can rivals realistically challenge it?", "Does its algorithm facilitate coordination?", "Does control over data create durable market power?", and "Can competition law react quickly enough to technological change?"

2. Fundamental Legal Framework

A. Anti-competitive agreements — Section 6

Section 6 addresses agreements, decisions and concerted practices that restrict competition.

Typical conduct includes:

• price fixing;
• market sharing;
• bid rigging;
• customer allocation;
• restrictions on output;
• anti-competitive information exchange;
• certain vertical restraints.

The provision corresponds substantially to Article 101 TFEU.

B. Abuse of dominance — Section 11

Dominance itself is not unlawful. The problem arises when a dominant undertaking uses its position in a manner that harms effective competition.

Potential abuses include:

• exclusionary rebates;
• predatory pricing;
• tying;
• refusal to supply;
• discriminatory conditions;
• excessive or unfair contractual conditions;
• exploitative conduct;
• platform parity clauses.

Section 11 operates alongside Article 102 TFEU.

C. Merger control

Danish merger control examines whether a transaction will significantly impede effective competition.

Ordinary turnover thresholds remain important, but Denmark now has an additional mechanism for investigating certain smaller transactions.

This is especially important for:

• start-up acquisitions;
• technology acquisitions;
• nascent competitors;
• data-rich companies;
• innovation-driven businesses;
• acquisitions where the target has low turnover but substantial competitive potential.

3. Major Future Challenges

I. Digital Platform Dominance

Digital platforms present a fundamental challenge because conventional market-share analysis may underestimate their competitive power.

Platforms can benefit from:

• network effects;
• data accumulation;
• economies of scale;
• switching costs;
• ecosystem integration;
• behavioural advantages;
• control over access to consumers.

A platform can therefore become difficult to challenge even before traditional measures of dominance fully capture its power.

Wolt illustrates the emerging problem

In August 2026, the Danish Competition Council found that Wolt Denmark had abused its dominant position through a price-parity clause and related contractual conditions affecting restaurants. The authority considered the platform's strong network effects and growing market position relevant to the competitive assessment.

Future issue

Danish competition law will increasingly need to examine:

ecosystem power rather than merely market-share power.

Questions may include:

• Can restaurants realistically leave the platform?
• Can consumers multi-home?
• Does platform data reinforce dominance?
• Does a parity clause prevent rival platforms from competing through lower commissions?
• Can a platform use its own marketplace data to disadvantage rivals?

4. Artificial Intelligence and Algorithmic Competition

AI is one of the most significant future challenges.

Algorithms can:

• determine prices;
• monitor competitors;
• predict demand;
• coordinate supply;
• personalise offers;
• identify customers;
• automatically respond to competitors.

The difficult legal question is whether human communication is necessary for unlawful coordination.

Visma Dinero AI Assistant

In 2026, the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority intervened concerning an AI assistant developed by Visma Dinero. The authority considered that the proposed system could facilitate exchanges of commercially sensitive information concerning competitors' costs and prices. The company stopped the planned version before launch.

This illustrates a major future problem:

Competition law may have to regulate potentially anti-competitive technological architecture before actual market harm occurs.

Future enforcement may need to distinguish between:

1. independent algorithmic pricing;
2. conscious algorithmic coordination;
3. information exchange through AI systems;
4. autonomous price alignment;
5. algorithmic collusion without direct human communication.

5. Algorithmic Collusion

Traditional cartel law usually looks for:

Competitor A ↔ communication ↔ Competitor B

AI markets may instead produce:

Algorithm A ↔ market data ↔ Algorithm B → parallel pricing

The legal difficulty is establishing:

• agreement;
• concerted practice;
• knowledge;
• intention;
• causation;
• competitive harm.

Danish authorities already possess experience dealing with information exchange. For example, the Competition Council found exchanges concerning future prices, discounts and quantities between clothing retailers contrary to Section 6 and Article 101 TFEU.

Future challenge

The law may have to develop concepts of:

• algorithmic communication;
• machine-mediated coordination;
• autonomous collusion;
• common pricing infrastructure;
• AI-enabled information exchange.

6. Below-Threshold and Killer Acquisitions

One of the most important recent developments is Denmark's power to investigate certain mergers falling below traditional notification thresholds.

The rationale is particularly important for digital and innovation markets.

A start-up may have:

• minimal current revenue;
• valuable intellectual property;
• important data;
• innovative technology;
• a rapidly growing user base;
• potential to become a competitor.

The Danish authority can now require notification of certain below-threshold transactions where the statutory conditions are satisfied.

Uber–Dantaxi

This development became concrete in the Uber/Dantaxi transaction.

The Danish Competition and Consumer Authority required notification of the transaction even though it fell below the ordinary turnover thresholds. The authority identified a potential risk to competition in the Danish taxi market.

In August 2026, the Competition Council approved the transaction subject to commitments, including the divestiture of a substantial part of Dantaxi. The authority described it as the first intervention in a merger that had already been implemented and the first use of the new below-threshold notification power in this context.

Future problem

The difficult question will be:

How far should merger control extend into acquisitions of companies whose present revenue does not reflect their future competitive significance?

7. Data as a Source of Market Power

Future competition cases will increasingly concern data.

Data can operate as a competitive asset because it can:

• improve algorithms;
• improve AI models;
• increase targeting accuracy;
• reduce search costs;
• improve products;
• reinforce network effects;
• create barriers to entry.

A major future issue is whether control over data can constitute:

• an essential competitive input;
• a barrier to entry;
• a source of dominance;
• an exclusionary advantage;
• an ecosystem lock-in mechanism.

Danish competition authorities are already dealing with digital-platform regulation alongside competition law, including the Platform-to-Business Regulation and cooperation with the European Commission concerning the Digital Markets Act.

8. Sustainability and Green Competition

Denmark's transition toward a green economy will create new competition-law questions.

Companies increasingly cooperate on:

• renewable-energy infrastructure;
• green hydrogen;
• carbon capture;
• battery technology;
• recycling;
• sustainable supply chains;
• emissions reduction;
• environmental standards.

Some cooperation can produce substantial environmental benefits.

But the same cooperation may potentially facilitate:

• price coordination;
• market sharing;
• exclusion of competitors;
• collective refusal to deal;
• standard-setting that disadvantages smaller firms.

Future challenge

Danish competition law will need to distinguish between:

genuine sustainability cooperation

and

environmental objectives being used as a vehicle for anti-competitive coordination.

9. Energy-Market Competition

Energy transition creates another major challenge.

Future electricity markets may involve:

• battery-storage operators;
• demand-response platforms;
• virtual power plants;
• smart grids;
• hydrogen networks;
• balancing markets;
• distributed generation;
• automated bidding systems.

The Danish experience already demonstrates the sensitivity of competition in electricity-reserve markets.

Effekthandel and CHP cases

In 2025, the Maritime and Commercial High Court dealt with test cases concerning Effekthandel and CHP plants. The court found unlawful coordination of bids and prices in auctions for electricity reserves in Western Denmark, concluding that the conduct restricted competition by object.

Future challenge

AI-controlled energy systems could make it substantially harder to distinguish:

• independent rational bidding;
• algorithmic parallel conduct;
• deliberate coordination;
• automated cartel behaviour.

10. Essential Facilities and Infrastructure

Denmark's economy contains infrastructure where access may be crucial to competition.

Examples include:

• telecommunications networks;
• digital infrastructure;
• ports;
• energy infrastructure;
• payment systems;
• transport infrastructure;
• broadband networks;
• data infrastructure.

A dominant infrastructure operator may have incentives to:

• refuse access;
• discriminate;
• charge excessive access prices;
• degrade interoperability;
• favour downstream affiliates.

Future Danish competition law will therefore increasingly intersect with sectoral regulation and essential-facility principles.

11. Merger Control in Concentrated Local Markets

Competition problems are not limited to multinational technology companies.

They can arise in:

• healthcare;
• pharmaceuticals;
• food distribution;
• telecommunications;
• broadband;
• construction;
• transportation;
• financial services;
• professional services.

Norlys/Ewii Fibernet

In 2025, the Competition Council initially identified competition concerns in Norlys' acquisition of Ewii Fibernet. The transaction was ultimately approved after commitments concerning alternative provision of broadband and television services to seven antenna associations.

This illustrates the future importance of structural and behavioural remedies rather than simply approving or prohibiting transactions.

12. Market Definition in Technology Markets

Market definition is becoming increasingly difficult.

Traditional questions ask:

What product does the consumer buy?

Digital markets may require questions such as:

• Is the service free?
• Is the real price paid through data?
• Is the market two-sided?
• Are advertisers and users separate markets?
• Does the platform compete through ecosystem functionality?
• Is the relevant market national or global?
• How should multi-homing be measured?

The Deutz/Diesel Motor Nordic litigation illustrates why rigorous market definition remains essential. The Eastern High Court remitted part of the case because the Competition Council's market definition and dominance assessment were inadequate.

Future implication

Competition authorities will need increasingly sophisticated:

• econometric analysis;
• behavioural evidence;
• data analysis;
• network-effect analysis;
• counterfactual modelling.

13. Platform Self-Preferencing

A platform may simultaneously act as:

1. marketplace operator;
2. infrastructure provider;
3. data collector;
4. competitor.

This creates a structural conflict.

Possible conduct includes:

• ranking own products higher;
• giving own services preferential access;
• using competitors' data;
• restricting interoperability;
• imposing discriminatory access conditions.

Future Danish enforcement will increasingly need to coordinate:

Danish Competition Act + Article 102 TFEU + DMA + P2B Regulation.

The Danish authority already participates in enforcement involving major digital platforms and assists the European Commission in DMA enforcement.

14. Exploitative Abuse and Unfair Contractual Conditions

Competition law historically concentrated heavily on protecting the competitive process.

Digital platforms raise additional questions about:

• unfair commissions;
• unilateral contract modification;
• discriminatory ranking;
• data extraction;
• platform fees;
• termination;
• dispute resolution;
• consumer lock-in.

The Wolt case is particularly important because the Danish Competition Council addressed both exclusionary and exploitative aspects of platform conduct.

This may make exploitative abuse increasingly relevant in platform markets.

15. Public Procurement and Competition

Public procurement represents a substantial part of the Danish economy.

Competition risks include:

• bid rigging;
• cover bids;
• market allocation;
• information exchange;
• repeated tender coordination.

Future procurement markets may become increasingly automated, making digital bid-rigging detection important.

Authorities may use:

• procurement databases;
• anomaly detection;
• statistical screening;
• AI-assisted cartel detection.

16. Minority Shareholdings and Common Ownership

Another unresolved issue is partial ownership between competitors.

The Danish authority has noted that Denmark and the EU do not generally have a comprehensive competition-law regime specifically covering non-controlling minority shareholdings, despite their possible competitive effects.

Future competition policy may therefore need to examine:

• common ownership;
• institutional investors;
• cross-shareholdings;
• board interlocks;
• information flows;
• strategic minority investments.

17. International and Nordic Enforcement

Danish markets are deeply integrated with:

• the EU;
• Nordic markets;
• Germany;
• global technology markets.

Competition enforcement increasingly requires cooperation between authorities.

Denmark already has established Nordic cooperation arrangements concerning competition cases.

Future enforcement will therefore require greater coordination concerning:

• digital platforms;
• cross-border mergers;
• energy markets;
• shipping;
• pharmaceuticals;
• AI;
• global supply chains.

18. Six Important Danish Competition-Law Cases

1. Post Danmark A/S — C-209/10

Issue: Abuse of dominance and rebate practices.

The EU Court of Justice considered Post Danmark's conduct under Article 102 TFEU. The case became an important reference point for effects-based analysis of exclusionary rebates.

The Danish authority subsequently confirmed that the Post Danmark matter had become final following the withdrawal of litigation.

Future relevance:
Important for analysing rebates, exclusionary strategies and effects-based assessment.

2. Post Danmark — Direct-Mail Rebates

The Danish Competition Council found that Post Danmark's retroactive rebate system could make it difficult for competitors to obtain customers. The case became an important Danish example of exclusionary rebate analysis.

Future relevance:
Digital platforms may use functionally similar mechanisms through:

• loyalty discounts;
• platform commissions;
• preferential ranking;
• bundled services.

3. Falck Danmark A/S

Falck was found to have abused its dominant position in the Danish ambulance-services market by pursuing a strategy aimed at excluding competitor BIOS.

The Copenhagen City Court imposed a DKK 30 million fine in 2019.

Future relevance:
Demonstrates the importance of exclusionary strategies in concentrated markets and the potential criminal-law consequences of serious competition infringements.

4. Deutz AG / Diesel Motor Nordic

The Eastern High Court remitted part of the case because the Competition Council's market definition and dominance assessment were inadequate.

The judgment illustrates that enforcement must rest on a sufficiently rigorous definition of the relevant market.

Future relevance:
Particularly significant for technology markets where conventional product boundaries can become unstable.

5. Norlys / Ewii Fibernet

The Competition Council identified competition concerns relating to the acquisition of Ewii Fibernet by Norlys. The transaction was ultimately approved after commitments designed to preserve alternative broadband and television supply for seven antenna associations.

Future relevance:
Illustrates the increasing importance of:

• digital infrastructure;
• access;
• vertical effects;
• local market concentration;
• merger remedies.

6. Uber / Dantaxi

The DCCA required notification of Uber's acquisition of Dantaxi despite the transaction falling below the ordinary turnover thresholds.

In August 2026, the Competition Council approved the merger subject to commitments including substantial divestiture.

Future relevance:
This is especially important for the future of Danish merger control because it demonstrates how Denmark can examine transactions that traditional turnover thresholds might miss.

7. Wolt Denmark

The Competition Council's August 2026 decision found Wolt had abused its dominant position through a price-parity clause and related contractual arrangements with restaurants.

Future relevance:
The case is directly relevant to:

• platform dominance;
• network effects;
• parity clauses;
• digital intermediation;
• exploitative contractual terms;
• platform dependence.

8. Effekthandel / CHP Energy Cases

The Maritime and Commercial High Court found unlawful coordination of bids and prices in electricity-reserve auctions involving Effekthandel and CHP plants.

Future relevance:
Demonstrates the continuing importance of cartel enforcement in increasingly complex energy markets.

19. Emerging Future Challenges — Consolidated Table

20. Possible Future Reforms

A. Stronger AI-specific competition guidance

Denmark could develop detailed guidance concerning:

• algorithmic pricing;
• AI information exchange;
• autonomous coordination;
• machine learning models;
• training-data access;
• AI interoperability.

B. Greater use of ex-ante regulation

Traditional competition law often operates after potentially harmful conduct has occurred.

For gatekeeper platforms, the future may involve greater reliance on:

• interoperability obligations;
• data-access rules;
• portability;
• transparency;
• non-discrimination;
• limits on self-preferencing.

The EU DMA already provides an important complementary framework, with the Danish authority assisting the European Commission in enforcement.

C. Improved merger screening

The Uber/Dantaxi experience demonstrates the practical significance of below-threshold merger review.

Future merger analysis may increasingly consider:

• innovation;
• data;
• user networks;
• potential competition;
• ecosystem effects;
• nascent competitors.

D. Competition-by-design

Companies may increasingly be expected to incorporate competition compliance into:

• algorithms;
• pricing systems;
• platform architecture;
• AI systems;
• data governance;
• merger planning.

21. Enforcement and Evidence Challenges

Future competition cases will increasingly involve evidence such as:

• source code;
• algorithmic logs;
• AI model outputs;
• API records;
• cloud data;
• internal messaging;
• automated pricing histories;
• blockchain records;
• platform ranking data.

This raises questions concerning:

• authenticity;
• explainability;
• confidentiality;
• technical expertise;
• reproducibility;
• discovery;
• evidentiary burden.

Competition authorities will therefore need increasingly sophisticated digital-forensics capabilities.

22. Institutional Challenges

The Danish Competition and Consumer Authority already performs several functions involving enforcement, market studies and international cooperation.

Future institutional challenges will include:

1. Technical expertise

Competition authorities need economists, lawyers, data scientists and AI specialists.

2. Speed

Digital markets can change much faster than conventional investigations.

3. Resource allocation

Authorities must decide which markets justify intensive investigation.

4. International coordination

Digital firms may operate across dozens of jurisdictions.

5. Remedy design

A traditional fine may not restore competition where a platform's structural position remains intact.

23. Future Conceptual Shift

The traditional Danish competition-law model can be represented as:

Market → Market Definition → Market Share → Dominance → Conduct → Effects

The future model is likely to become more sophisticated:

Data → Algorithms → Network Effects → Ecosystem → Market Power → Conduct → Innovation Effects → Consumer Effects → Structural Effects

This does not mean that traditional competition law disappears. Rather, traditional principles will have to operate alongside new forms of economic and technological analysis.

24. Conclusion

The future challenges for Danish competition law arise from the transformation of markets themselves.

The most significant challenges are:

1. AI-driven competition;
2. algorithmic collusion;
3. digital-platform dominance;
4. data-driven market power;
5. below-threshold and killer acquisitions;
6. ecosystem competition;
7. platform self-preferencing;
8. sustainability cooperation;
9. energy-market transformation;
10. essential infrastructure access;
11. common ownership and minority shareholdings;
12. cross-border digital enforcement.

Recent Danish enforcement already shows this transition. Wolt illustrates platform dominance; Uber/Dantaxi illustrates below-threshold merger intervention; Visma Dinero illustrates AI-related competition risks; Effekthandel illustrates technologically complex energy-market coordination; and Norlys/Ewii illustrates competition concerns in digital infrastructure.

The central future challenge is therefore not simply whether Danish competition law can prohibit traditional cartels and abuses. It is whether the legal system can identify competitive harm early enough in markets where power is created through data, algorithms, network effects, ecosystems and technological control, while preserving rigorous economic analysis and due process.