Competition Law and Competition Implications of Trust Concentration

Introduction

Trust concentration refers to a market situation in which a small number of undertakings, platforms, intermediaries, institutions, or ecosystems accumulate a disproportionately large share of the trust on which commercial transactions depend. Here, “trust” may arise from reputation, reliability, certification, ratings, authentication, data integrity, security, professional credentials, brand credibility, or the perceived neutrality of an intermediary.

Trust itself is not ordinarily a separate antitrust asset. However, when control over trust becomes concentrated, it can generate market power, entry barriers, switching costs, network effects, information advantages, and dependency. Competition law therefore becomes relevant when the accumulation or exploitation of trust is connected with exclusionary conduct, collusion, tying, discriminatory access, self-preferencing, refusal to deal, or anticompetitive mergers.

The issue is particularly important in digital platforms, financial services, certification markets, professional services, healthcare, online marketplaces, rating systems, cybersecurity, payment systems, and data-driven ecosystems.

1. Meaning of Trust Concentration

Trust concentration occurs when market participants increasingly depend upon one or a few entities to establish or verify commercial credibility.

Examples include:

• one platform controlling consumer ratings and seller reputation;
• one payment network becoming the principal trusted authentication intermediary;
• one certification body becoming indispensable for market access;
• one digital platform controlling identity verification;
• one search or marketplace platform determining which businesses are considered reliable;
• one financial institution becoming the dominant source of creditworthiness information;
• one technology ecosystem controlling security certificates or authentication standards.

The competition concern does not arise merely because an undertaking is trusted.

The concern arises when:

Trust becomes an economic bottleneck and the undertaking controlling that bottleneck can use it to exclude or disadvantage competitors.

2. Competition-Law Framework

Trust concentration can potentially engage several areas of competition law.

A. Dominant Position

A firm possessing a highly concentrated trust resource may acquire a dominant position where competitors cannot realistically reproduce its reputation, network, authentication system, historical data, or user confidence.

Relevant considerations include:

• market share;
• network effects;
• switching costs;
• reputation;
• access to data;
• consumer dependence;
• barriers to entry;
• interoperability;
• countervailing buyer power.

B. Abuse of Dominance

Once dominance exists, competition concerns may arise from:

• discriminatory access to trust infrastructure;
• refusal to provide verification;
• exclusionary certification requirements;
• self-preferencing;
• tying trust services to other products;
• exploitative contractual conditions;
• discriminatory rankings;
• foreclosure of competing intermediaries.

C. Merger Control

A merger may raise concerns where it combines:

• a major marketplace with a major ratings platform;
• a payment provider with an identity-verification provider;
• a certification provider with a dominant manufacturer;
• a large platform with a major reputation-data provider.

Traditional market-share analysis may not fully capture the competitive significance of control over trust infrastructure.

D. Information and Data Concentration

Trust systems frequently depend upon accumulated information.

Historical:

• transaction data,
• customer reviews,
• fraud records,
• ratings,
• identity information,
• behavioural data,

can make an incumbent's trust system increasingly difficult to replicate.

This creates a possible data-driven feedback loop:

More users → more transactions → more information → better trust signals → greater consumer confidence → more users.

3. Network Effects and Trust Concentration

Trust frequently exhibits positive network effects.

A marketplace with many buyers attracts more sellers. More sellers generate more transactions and reviews. More transactions improve the platform's ability to identify fraud and assess reliability. Improved reliability attracts additional buyers.

Thus:

Scale → information → trust → users → greater scale.

This can produce substantial entry barriers.

A new entrant may offer a technologically superior service but still struggle because consumers ask:

“Why should I trust a new intermediary when everyone already uses the established one?”

This is an important competition-law distinction between competition on the merits and competitive foreclosure through control of an essential trust mechanism.

4. Trust Concentration and Barriers to Entry

Trust can constitute an intangible entry barrier.

A new undertaking may need to spend substantial resources to establish:

• brand reputation;
• consumer reviews;
• professional accreditation;
• security credentials;
• fraud-detection records;
• transaction history;
• seller verification;
• institutional credibility.

An incumbent may possess these advantages because of its historical position rather than because of superior current performance.

Competition authorities therefore may examine whether an incumbent has used its accumulated trust to prevent rivals from achieving minimum viable scale.

5. Trust Concentration and Self-Preferencing

A particularly important concern arises where the entity controlling trust infrastructure also competes downstream.

For example, a marketplace may:

1. verify sellers;
2. collect seller-performance information;
3. determine seller reliability;
4. operate its own competing retail business.

If the platform uses information generated through its trust system to favour its own products, competition concerns may arise.

The central issue becomes:

Is the trust infrastructure being administered neutrally, or is it being used as a competitive weapon?

6. Trust Concentration and Interoperability

Interoperability can reduce the competitive consequences of trust concentration.

Possible mechanisms include:

• portability of ratings;
• portability of verification credentials;
• interoperability of identity systems;
• standardized certification;
• transferability of reputation scores;
• open APIs;
• common authentication standards.

Without portability, consumers and businesses may remain locked into an incumbent because leaving means losing accumulated reputation.

This produces a form of trust switching cost.

7. Trust Concentration and Consumer Lock-In

Consider an online professional marketplace where a consultant has accumulated:

• 500 verified reviews;
• a five-year transaction history;
• a high reliability score;
• verified credentials.

If those credentials cannot be transferred to another platform, moving to a competing platform may impose a substantial economic loss.

The result is:

Reputation accumulation → switching cost → reduced multi-homing → stronger incumbent position.

This is especially significant in platform markets.

8. Trust Concentration and Refusal to Deal

A dominant undertaking may control an infrastructure that determines whether another undertaking is considered trustworthy.

If access to that system is commercially indispensable, refusal to provide access can potentially constitute exclusionary conduct.

Competition analysis normally requires consideration of:

• indispensability;
• availability of alternatives;
• feasibility of access;
• objective justification;
• effect on competition;
• possibility of downstream foreclosure.

The mere existence of a valuable trust system does not automatically create a duty to share it.

9. Trust Concentration and Tying

A dominant undertaking may potentially exploit trust in one market to obtain power in another.

For example:

Trusted identity service → compulsory use of the provider's payment service.

Or:

Trusted marketplace status → compulsory use of the platform's logistics service.

The competition concern becomes stronger where the trusted service has substantial market power and customers have little practical ability to obtain the tied service independently.

10. Trust Concentration and Mergers

Merger control is particularly relevant because trust is often accumulated through ecosystems.

A transaction involving two firms may not create a conventional horizontal monopoly but may nevertheless combine complementary trust resources.

For example:

Authorities may therefore need to examine ecosystem effects, not merely traditional market shares.

11. Major Case Laws

1. United Brands v Commission

Case: United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission, Case 27/76, European Court of Justice (1978).

Principle

The Court recognized the importance of examining the economic power of an undertaking in its relevant market and whether its position allows it to behave independently of competitors, customers, and consumers.

Relevance to Trust Concentration

United Brands demonstrates the broader principle that dominance concerns arise from economic power and commercial dependence, rather than market share alone.

In trust-based markets, a firm may acquire substantial economic power because customers and counterparties depend upon its reputation, verification system, or established network.

The case therefore provides an important foundation for analysing whether concentrated trust translates into independence from competitive constraints.

12. Microsoft v Commission

Case: Microsoft Corp. v Commission, Case T-201/04, General Court (2007).

Principle

The case concerned Microsoft's dominant position and its refusal to provide interoperability information to competitors.

The Court upheld important aspects of the Commission's finding that Microsoft's conduct could restrict competition by preventing competitors from developing interoperable products.

Relevance to Trust Concentration

The case is highly relevant to trust-based digital ecosystems.

A dominant undertaking may control an ecosystem in which:

• users depend upon compatibility;
• technical information is concentrated;
• competitors require access to interoperation;
• network effects reinforce the incumbent.

Trust ecosystems can function similarly.

If users trust one ecosystem and competing services cannot interoperate with it, technical incompatibility can reinforce trust concentration.

The case therefore illustrates the relationship between interoperability, network effects and exclusionary market power.

13. Google Shopping

Case: Google Search (Shopping), European Commission Decision AT.39740 (2017), subsequently considered by the EU Courts.

Principle

The case concerned Google's preferential positioning and display of its comparison-shopping service within general search results.

The competition concern involved the use of Google's dominant position in general search to favour its own downstream service.

Relevance to Trust Concentration

Search engines are important trust intermediaries.

Users frequently treat prominent search results as signals of:

• relevance;
• reliability;
• legitimacy;
• quality.

Consequently, control over ranking can influence not merely visibility but also perceived commercial credibility.

The case illustrates how a dominant intermediary's control over an information gateway can potentially be used to favour its own downstream activities.

14. Google Android

Case: Google Android, European Commission Decision AT.40099 (2018), General Court, Case T-604/18.

Principle

The case involved Google's conduct concerning Android, including restrictions connected with licensing, search, browsers and the Android ecosystem.

The EU competition analysis focused substantially on the relationship between dominance, contractual restrictions and reinforcing network effects.

Relevance to Trust Concentration

A dominant ecosystem can make users and developers increasingly dependent upon a common technological environment.

Trust can become part of that ecosystem through:

• security;
• authentication;
• application distribution;
• platform certification;
• default services.

The case demonstrates how contractual restrictions within an ecosystem can reinforce an incumbent's position across related markets.

15. Intel v Commission

Case: Intel Corp. v Commission, Case C-413/14 P, Court of Justice of the European Union (2017).

Principle

The Court emphasized the importance of assessing whether allegedly exclusionary rebates are capable of restricting competition, particularly through an effects-based analysis.

The case is significant for the proposition that the legal assessment of exclusionary conduct cannot always be reduced to the formal structure of the conduct.

Relevance to Trust Concentration

Trust-based markets frequently involve loyalty incentives.

A dominant platform might provide:

• preferred verification;
• enhanced trust badges;
• higher rankings;
• reduced fees;
• privileged certification;

to businesses that remain within its ecosystem.

The Intel approach is relevant because the competition analysis may need to consider the actual or potential exclusionary effects of such arrangements.

16. Bronner v Mediaprint

Case: Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-7/97, Court of Justice (1998).

Principle

The Court established a restrictive approach to refusal-to-deal claims involving infrastructure controlled by a dominant undertaking.

Among the important considerations were whether access was indispensable and whether duplication was realistically possible.

Relevance to Trust Concentration

This principle is especially relevant where a dominant firm controls a trusted infrastructure.

For example:

• an authentication network;
• an industry certification system;
• a reputation database;
• a transaction-verification platform.

The fact that such infrastructure is valuable does not automatically mean that competitors have a legal right to access it.

The crucial competition-law question is whether the trust infrastructure is genuinely indispensable and whether refusal has the capacity to eliminate effective competition.

17. MEO v Autoridade da Concorrência

Case: MEO – Serviços de Comunicações e Multimédia SA v Autoridade da Concorrência, Case C-525/16, Court of Justice (2018).

Principle

The Court examined discriminatory pricing under Article 102 TFEU and emphasized that not every difference in treatment by a dominant undertaking necessarily constitutes an abuse.

An assessment of competitive disadvantage and actual or potential effects may be required.

Relevance to Trust Concentration

Trust platforms frequently assign different:

• ratings;
• verification levels;
• access conditions;
• ranking positions;
• commissions;
• trust badges

to different market participants.

The case is useful for distinguishing legitimate differentiation from discriminatory conduct capable of harming competition.

18. United States v Google

Case: United States v Google LLC, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 2024 judgment concerning Google's general search services.

Principle

The case concerned Google's conduct in maintaining and reinforcing its position in general search, including distribution arrangements.

The proceedings illustrate the significance of distribution, default positions, scale and network effects in digital markets.

Relevance to Trust Concentration

Search engines function as commercial gatekeepers because users often rely upon them to identify trustworthy information and businesses.

Where one undertaking controls a major discovery gateway, concentration can produce:

Distribution power → visibility power → credibility effects → user dependence → stronger market position.

The case therefore illustrates how control over an information gateway can reinforce market power beyond conventional product characteristics.

19. Competition Risks Created by Trust Concentration

A. Reputation Bottleneck

A dominant platform can become the primary mechanism through which businesses establish credibility.

Competitors may then find it difficult to attract customers without access to that reputation infrastructure.

B. Trust-Based Entry Barriers

New firms may have to overcome years of accumulated:

• reviews;
• security records;
• transaction histories;
• professional credentials;
• brand recognition.

This can make entry expensive and slow.

C. Data-Trust Feedback Loops

A large platform can accumulate more data because users trust it.

That data improves fraud detection and personalization, which further increases trust.

The result can be a self-reinforcing cycle:

Data → better trust → more users → more data.

D. Trust Portability Problems

Where users cannot move their:

• ratings;
• reviews;
• credentials;
• identity verification;
• transaction history,

to competing platforms, switching becomes costly.

This can reduce competition even without an explicit contractual exclusivity clause.

E. Self-Preferencing

A platform controlling trust signals may give its own services:

• higher rankings;
• superior verification;
• preferred badges;
• greater visibility;
• preferential access.

This can transform a trust mechanism into an exclusionary tool.

F. Discriminatory Access

A dominant trust intermediary may impose different requirements on competitors.

Examples include:

• higher verification fees;
• slower certification;
• restricted API access;
• discriminatory data access;
• unequal authentication standards.

G. Algorithmic Trust Manipulation

In digital markets, algorithms can determine:

• seller ratings;
• search rankings;
• fraud scores;
• recommendation positions;
• trust badges.

Manipulation of these systems can affect competitive opportunities.

20. Legitimate Trust Concentration versus Anticompetitive Concentration

Not every concentration of trust is harmful.

Trust concentration may result from legitimate competition based on:

• superior security;
• better customer service;
• successful innovation;
• lower fraud;
• higher product quality;
• strong privacy protection;
• reliable performance.

Competition law should therefore distinguish:

Legitimate accumulation

Better service → consumer preference → greater trust → increased market share.

from:

Potentially exclusionary accumulation

Dominant position → control over trust infrastructure → exclusion of rivals → reduced competitive alternatives → further concentration.

The second situation raises substantially greater competition concerns.

21. Remedies

Competition authorities may consider several remedies depending upon the conduct and jurisdiction.

Structural remedies

• divestiture;
• separation of trust infrastructure from downstream commercial operations;
• prohibition of certain acquisitions.

Behavioural remedies

• non-discriminatory access;
• interoperability obligations;
• API access;
• transparent ranking rules;
• restrictions on self-preferencing;
• separation of certification and commercial functions.

Data-related remedies

• reputation portability;
• data portability;
• interoperability;
• user-controlled credentials;
• standardized verification protocols.

Transparency remedies

Platforms may be required to explain:

• ranking criteria;
• verification decisions;
• account suspension;
• trust scores;
• certification requirements.

22. Compliance Framework for Businesses

Businesses operating trust-intensive platforms should consider:

1. Separate trust administration from competitive operations where feasible.
2. Establish objective verification criteria.
3. Apply those criteria consistently.
4. Avoid discriminatory access.
5. Provide transparent appeal mechanisms.
6. Permit appropriate portability of reputation data.
7. Maintain interoperable technical standards where justified.
8. Document legitimate reasons for ranking decisions.
9. Monitor self-preferencing risks.
10. Conduct competition assessments before acquiring another trust intermediary.

23. Emerging Issues

Trust concentration is likely to become increasingly significant in:

Artificial Intelligence

AI systems may become trusted intermediaries for:

• financial decisions;
• medical information;
• recruitment;
• legal research;
• procurement.

Control over trusted AI infrastructure could create new forms of market power.

Digital Identity

Dominant identity-verification providers could become gatekeepers for digital commerce.

Financial Technology

Creditworthiness and fraud-prevention systems can concentrate highly valuable trust information.

Online Marketplaces

Ratings and reputation systems may become increasingly important competitive assets.

Cybersecurity

A small number of security providers may become trusted gateways for enterprise digital infrastructure.

Professional Platforms

Professional credentials, reviews and verified experience can create highly portable—or highly non-portable—reputation capital.

24. Key Legal Principles from the Cases

Conclusion

Trust concentration is not inherently an antitrust violation. It becomes a competition concern when control over trust functions as a mechanism for acquiring, maintaining, or extending market power and is used to restrict competitive access.

The principal competition-law risks can be summarized as:

Trust concentration → network effects → switching costs → entry barriers → dependency → potential market power → possible exclusionary conduct.

The central legal inquiry should therefore not simply be “Who has the most trust?”, but rather:

How was the trust accumulated, whether competitors can reasonably build or access alternative trust mechanisms, whether users can transfer their reputation and credentials, and whether the incumbent uses control over trust to foreclose competition.

Accordingly, future competition-law analysis of digital and knowledge-intensive markets will increasingly need to treat reputation, verification, authentication, reliability data and institutional credibility as economically significant sources of competitive advantage, while preserving the distinction between trust earned through competition and trust leveraged to suppress competition.