Affiliate Ecosystem Dependency and Manipulation Risks in Europe

1. Introduction

An affiliate ecosystem is a commercial network in which a platform, merchant, advertiser, publisher, influencer, comparison website, app developer, agency, or other intermediary receives compensation for directing customers, generating leads, sales, clicks, installations, subscriptions, or other measurable actions.

A simplified structure is:

Platform/Merchant → Affiliate Network → Affiliates/Publishers/Influencers → Consumers

Modern affiliate ecosystems can become highly dependent on one dominant platform because the platform may control:

traffic;

ranking;

tracking technology;

attribution;

commission rates;

payment;

access to customers;

search visibility;

APIs;

advertising tools;

marketplace participation;

affiliate-program rules.

The legal concern arises when economic dependency is combined with manipulation, such as arbitrary commission changes, discriminatory ranking, withholding data, manipulating attribution, self-preferencing, exclusion of rival affiliates, or using affiliates' commercially sensitive information.

European competition law does not prohibit dependency by itself. The important question is whether the conduct amounts to an infringement of Article 101 or Article 102 TFEU, or violates the DMA, DSA, consumer, data-protection or contractual rules. Article 102 specifically prohibits abuse by a dominant undertaking, while dominance itself is not unlawful. (Competition Policy)

2. What Is Affiliate Ecosystem Dependency?

Dependency exists where an affiliate substantially relies upon one platform for economically important functions.

For example:

An affiliate obtains 85% of its traffic and nearly all of its commission income from Platform A.

The affiliate may technically be free to leave, but leaving could mean losing:

customers;

ranking;

tracking infrastructure;

historical data;

accumulated reputation;

commissions;

API access.

This creates a distinction between:

Ordinary commercial dependence

A business voluntarily relies heavily on another business.

Competition-law dependency

The dependence is combined with conduct by a dominant undertaking capable of excluding competitors or exploiting trading partners.

Contractual dependency

The relationship may also create claims based on:

unfair terms;

breach of contract;

termination;

good faith;

notice requirements;

commission disputes.

3. Main Forms of Manipulation

A. Ranking manipulation

A platform may change its ranking algorithm so that:

its own affiliate programme receives greater visibility;

selected affiliates receive preferential placement;

competing affiliates disappear from prominent results.

This raises self-preferencing and foreclosure questions.

B. Commission manipulation

A platform might:

reduce commission rates;

impose retroactive commission changes;

create discriminatory commission structures;

condition commissions on use of affiliated services.

A commission change is not automatically unlawful. The legal analysis depends on dominance, contractual terms, discriminatory effects and competitive consequences.

C. Attribution manipulation

Affiliate systems generally determine which affiliate receives credit for a transaction.

Manipulation could involve:

changing attribution windows;

overriding referral cookies;

reallocating sales;

suppressing conversions;

favouring affiliated traffic sources.

This can produce direct economic loss.

D. Data manipulation

The platform may possess information about:

affiliate traffic;

conversion rates;

customer behaviour;

sales volumes;

commissions;

competitor performance.

A serious competition issue may arise if a dominant platform uses non-public affiliate information to compete against the affiliates supplying that information.

E. Access manipulation

The platform might restrict:

API access;

tracking tools;

advertising inventory;

product feeds;

customer information;

technical interfaces.

The legal question may then resemble refusal-to-deal or discriminatory-access cases.

4. Relevant European Legal Framework

Article 101 TFEU

Article 101 can apply where agreements between undertakings restrict competition.

Potential examples include:

exclusive affiliate arrangements;

restrictions preventing affiliates from working with competitors;

coordinated commission arrangements;

market allocation;

restrictions on advertising rival products.

Article 101 expressly addresses agreements that restrict competition and discriminatory conditions between trading partners. (Competition Policy)

Article 102 TFEU

Article 102 becomes particularly important where a dominant platform controls access to an affiliate ecosystem.

Possible abuses include:

discriminatory conditions;

exclusionary rebates;

tying;

refusal of access;

self-preferencing;

leveraging;

excessive or unfair conditions;

use of dominance in one market to restrict competition in another.

The Commission identifies vertical integration and barriers to entry among the factors relevant to dominance. (Competition Policy)

5. Case 1 — Google Shopping

Google and Alphabet v Commission

C-48/22 P, CJEU, 10 September 2024

This is a major authority for self-preferencing and leveraging.

Google was found to have favoured its own comparison-shopping service within general search results.

The Court upheld the essential finding that the conduct could constitute an abuse where a dominant platform uses its position in an upstream service to favour its own downstream service.

Affiliate relevance

Suppose:

Search platform → affiliate traffic → affiliated shopping service

If the platform gives its own affiliate ecosystem preferential ranking while disadvantaging independent affiliate/comparison services, Google Shopping provides an important analytical analogy.

Principle

A dominant digital platform cannot automatically justify preferential treatment of its own downstream service merely by describing the conduct as an ordinary feature of its platform.

6. Case 2 — Amazon Marketplace

European Commission, AT.40462

Amazon's marketplace investigations are highly relevant to affiliate-style ecosystem dependency because Amazon simultaneously operated:

a marketplace used by independent sellers; and

its own retail business competing with those sellers.

The Commission was concerned about Amazon's use of non-public third-party seller data for its own retail operations. It also investigated Buy Box and Prime criteria that could favour Amazon or certain third-party sellers. (European Commission)

Amazon ultimately offered commitments, which the Commission made binding in December 2022. These included measures concerning seller data and non-discriminatory access to Buy Box and Prime. (Competition Policy)

Affiliate relevance

The structural problem is similar:

Platform receives commercially valuable information from dependent businesses → platform also competes with those businesses.

For affiliates, equivalent information could include:

conversion rates;

traffic volumes;

customer acquisition data;

product performance;

commission sensitivity.

Key principle

Information obtained through operating an ecosystem can create competition concerns when the platform subsequently uses that information to compete against ecosystem participants.

7. Case 3 — Bronner

Oscar Bronner GmbH v Mediaprint

C-7/97, CJEU, 26 November 1998

Bronner is a foundational case concerning refusal of access by a dominant undertaking.

The Court applied a demanding test before imposing an obligation to provide access to infrastructure.

Affiliate application

Imagine an affiliate depends upon:

a platform's API;

its tracking system;

its product feed;

its affiliate-management infrastructure.

If access is withdrawn, the affiliate may claim that the platform has excluded it.

But commercial dependence alone does not automatically create a legal right to continued access.

The Bronner principles require careful analysis of indispensability and alternative access.

8. Case 4 — Slovak Telekom

Slovak Telekom and Deutsche Telekom v Commission

C-165/19 P, CJEU, 25 March 2021

This case concerns vertically related markets and access conditions.

Affiliate application

Consider:

Platform infrastructure → affiliate distribution → consumers

If a dominant platform imposes upstream conditions that make downstream affiliate competition commercially impossible, the conduct may raise Article 102 concerns.

Potential examples:

excessive platform fees;

discriminatory API charges;

restrictive technical conditions;

preferential access for affiliated businesses.

Principle

Vertical control over an important input can affect competition downstream.

9. Case 5 — Deutsche Telekom

Deutsche Telekom v Commission

C-280/08 P, CJEU, 14 October 2010

Deutsche Telekom is a leading margin-squeeze authority.

The basic concern is:

High upstream cost + insufficient downstream margin = potential exclusion of efficient competitors

Affiliate application

Suppose a platform:

charges independent affiliates high access fees;

takes large commissions;

gives its own affiliate operation materially better economics.

Independent affiliates may be unable to compete even if they are efficient.

The precise legal test depends on the circumstances, but the case provides an important framework for vertically integrated ecosystems.

10. Case 6 — Servizio Elettrico Nazionale

C-377/20, CJEU, 12 May 2022

The Court examined exclusionary conduct involving an incumbent's advantages and stressed the importance of distinguishing legitimate competition from conduct capable of restricting competition.

Affiliate relevance

A dominant platform may possess advantages created by its existing ecosystem:

consumer relationships;

historical transaction data;

affiliate performance information;

customer behaviour;

network effects.

Using those advantages to compete is not automatically unlawful.

But using them in a way that artificially excludes competitors may attract Article 102 scrutiny.

11. Case 7 — Intel

Intel v Commission

C-413/14 P, CJEU, 6 September 2017

Intel is important for exclusionary rebates and effects analysis.

Affiliate application

A platform might offer:

higher commissions to selected affiliates;

bonuses conditional on exclusivity;

traffic incentives;

preferential rates;

rebates tied to minimum transaction volumes.

The legal question is not simply whether an incentive exists.

It is whether, considering the circumstances, the arrangement is capable of excluding competitors and restricting competition.

12. Case 8 — Google AdSense

The Google AdSense proceedings are directly relevant to the advertising side of affiliate ecosystems.

The European Commission examined contractual restrictions associated with Google's online advertising intermediation activities.

The broader lesson is that contractual restrictions imposed by a powerful intermediary can affect competition where businesses depend upon the intermediary for access to customers and advertising demand.

This is especially relevant to affiliate networks where publishers and traffic providers depend upon a dominant platform's advertising and referral infrastructure.

13. Case 9 — Meta Platforms

Meta Platforms and Others

C-252/21, CJEU, 4 July 2023

Meta is important because affiliate ecosystems increasingly depend upon personalisation and behavioural data.

The Court considered the relationship between:

data processing;

personalised advertising;

market power;

competition law.

It confirmed that a competition authority can consider GDPR compliance when assessing abuse of dominance, while respecting the competence of data-protection authorities.

Affiliate relevance

A platform may use:

affiliate traffic data;

advertising data;

user data;

conversion data;

cross-service information

to strengthen its competitive position.

This creates a potential intersection between data protection and competition law.

14. Case 10 — Google Android

Google and Alphabet v Commission

C-48/22 P / related Google Android litigation

The Android litigation demonstrates how contractual and technical restrictions within a digital ecosystem can reinforce platform power.

Its broader significance for affiliate ecosystems concerns:

default arrangements;

ecosystem dependence;

tying;

distribution restrictions;

access to users.

An affiliate may technically have alternatives but face substantial switching costs because consumers are concentrated within one ecosystem.

15. Dependency Is Not Automatically Dominance

This is a very important distinction.

An affiliate may be economically dependent on Platform A.

That does not automatically mean:

Platform A is dominant under Article 102.

Competition authorities normally first define the relevant market and then assess dominance.

Relevant factors include:

market share;

barriers to entry;

switching costs;

network effects;

financial resources;

vertical integration;

alternative platforms;

countervailing buyer power.

The Commission expressly states that market definition precedes assessment of dominance and that market share is only an initial indicator. (Competition Policy)

16. Economic Dependence Under National Law

Even where Article 102 does not apply, national commercial law may sometimes address abusive economic dependence.

Member States differ considerably in their approaches.

Possible legal concepts include:

abuse of economic dependence;

unfair commercial practices;

good faith;

unfair contract terms;

wrongful termination;

commercial agency rules;

contractual imbalance.

Therefore:

No Article 102 dominance ≠ no possible legal remedy.

The precise remedy depends on the relevant Member State's law.

17. Affiliate Ranking Manipulation

Suppose an online platform operates an affiliate programme.

It ranks affiliates according to an algorithm.

The platform then secretly changes the algorithm to:

downgrade independent affiliates;

promote its own affiliate partners;

promote affiliates accepting lower commissions;

suppress affiliates cooperating with competitors.

Potential legal questions include:

Is the platform dominant?

Is ranking commercially essential?

Is the ranking discriminatory?

Are the criteria transparent?

Are affiliated businesses receiving preferential treatment?

Are independent affiliates being foreclosed?

Is there an objective justification?

This is where Google Shopping becomes particularly relevant.

18. Commission Manipulation

Assume:

Affiliate A receives 10% commission.

Platform changes the system:

Independent Affiliate A → 4%

Platform-affiliated Affiliate B → 12%

If the platform is dominant and the difference is capable of excluding independent affiliates, competition-law issues may arise.

But a difference in commission rates is not automatically unlawful.

The authority must consider:

cost differences;

services supplied;

quality;

volume;

exclusivity;

duration;

foreclosure effects;

objective justification.

19. Attribution Manipulation

Affiliate attribution is particularly sensitive.

Example:

Affiliate A sends the consumer to the merchant.

Later:

another platform advertisement appears;

the platform changes the attribution window;

Affiliate A loses the commission.

If the platform systematically changes attribution rules to favour its own traffic source, possible issues include:

contractual breach;

unfair trading conditions;

discrimination;

competition foreclosure;

consumer transparency.

Evidence might include:

click records;

referral IDs;

timestamps;

cookie records;

server logs;

attribution algorithms.

20. Data Exploitation

Imagine Platform A operates an affiliate network.

It knows:

which products sell best;

which affiliate converts best;

which keywords generate sales;

which customers have high purchasing value.

Platform A then launches its own competing affiliate service.

It uses the historical affiliate data to identify the most profitable traffic segments.

This resembles the structural concern examined in the Amazon marketplace investigation, where the Commission focused on use of non-public third-party seller data for Amazon's competing retail business. (European Commission)

21. Affiliate Lock-In

Dependency becomes stronger when an affiliate loses accumulated value by switching.

Examples:

historical SEO rankings;

customer reviews;

tracking history;

commission history;

technical integrations;

customer lists;

platform reputation;

accumulated conversion data.

This creates:

Switching Cost → Dependency → Reduced Bargaining Power

A dominant platform may therefore have greater ability to impose conditions on affiliates.

22. Digital Markets Act

Where the relevant platform is a designated gatekeeper and the relevant service falls within the DMA, additional ex-ante rules may apply.

This is significant because the DMA can address certain ecosystem conduct without requiring the full traditional Article 102 dominance-and-abuse analysis.

The Commission's July 2026 enforcement against Google illustrates the practical significance of DMA rules concerning self-preferencing and steering. (Digital Markets Act (DMA))

For affiliate ecosystems, steering restrictions can be particularly important because affiliates often depend upon their ability to:

inform consumers → redirect consumers → complete transactions.

23. DSA and Affiliate Systems

The Digital Services Act can also become relevant to online platforms.

The Commission's 2025 AliExpress proceedings, for example, included concerns involving the platform's affiliate programme, verification and monitoring systems, hidden links, advertising and recommender systems. The Commission ultimately made commitments binding. (Digital Strategy)

This demonstrates that affiliate programmes can involve not only competition concerns but also:

platform transparency;

hidden commercial relationships;

consumer protection;

advertising disclosure;

recommender systems;

trader traceability.

24. Civil Liability

Affiliate manipulation can generate private civil claims.

Potential claimants include:

Affiliates

For:

unpaid commissions;

wrongful termination;

discriminatory treatment;

lost profits;

breach of contract.

Merchants

For:

fraudulent traffic;

manipulated leads;

false conversions;

misleading affiliate activity.

Consumers

For:

undisclosed sponsored relationships;

misleading affiliate endorsements;

deceptive commercial practices.

Competing platforms

For:

exclusionary conduct;

loss of customers;

foreclosure;

competition damages.

25. Causation

The claimant must normally connect the manipulation to actual loss.

Example:

Platform changes ranking → affiliate traffic falls 40% → sales decline 30%

That does not automatically prove causation.

Alternative causes could include:

seasonal demand;

Google algorithm changes;

competitor entry;

consumer preferences;

economic recession;

product changes.

A court may therefore require:

historical traffic data;

controlled comparisons;

algorithm records;

commission statements;

counterfactual analysis;

expert economic evidence.

26. Evidence

Affiliate disputes can become highly data-intensive.

Important evidence includes:

affiliate agreements;

commission schedules;

ranking algorithms;

attribution rules;

API records;

clickstream data;

conversion logs;

payment records;

internal platform communications;

algorithm-change histories;

A/B testing results.

Where the platform controls the evidence, disclosure and access-to-information issues become particularly important.

27. Hypothetical Example

Assume Platform X operates an online marketplace and affiliate network.

It has:

10,000 independent affiliates;

its own affiliate programme;

its own advertising service;

its own comparison website.

Platform X changes its ranking algorithm.

Independent affiliates are systematically downgraded.

Platform X's own affiliate service receives priority.

It also uses non-public affiliate conversion data to identify the most profitable products.

Finally, it reduces independent affiliate commissions from 8% to 2%.

Possible legal analysis

Step 1 — Market

Define the relevant affiliate/platform market.

Step 2 — Dominance

Determine whether Platform X possesses substantial market power.

Step 3 — Dependency

Measure affiliate reliance and switching costs.

Step 4 — Conduct

Identify:

self-preferencing;

data exploitation;

discriminatory ranking;

commission changes.

Step 5 — Effects

Determine whether independent affiliates are actually or potentially foreclosed.

Step 6 — Justification

Consider legitimate efficiency explanations.

Step 7 — Competition law

Assess Articles 101/102 and, where applicable, DMA.

Step 8 — Private law

Assess contract and damages claims.

28. Case-Law Comparison

29. Direct vs Analogical Authorities

It is important not to overstate the case law.

More directly relevant

Amazon Marketplace — platform uses third-party business information while competing with those businesses.

Google Shopping — platform self-preferencing.

Meta Platforms — data-driven platform and advertising model.

AliExpress DSA proceedings — affiliate-programme risks.

Analogical judicial authorities

Bronner

Slovak Telekom

Deutsche Telekom

Intel

Servizio Elettrico Nazionale

There is not yet a mature CJEU doctrine specifically named “affiliate ecosystem dependency.” The legal outcome depends on the particular combination of dominance, contractual dependency, conduct, foreclosure, data use and applicable national law.

30. Key Legal Test

A useful examination formula is:

Affiliate dependency

↓

Market power / dominance

↓

Platform control

↓

Manipulative conduct

↓

Self-preferencing / discrimination / data exploitation / exclusion

↓

Foreclosure or exploitation

↓

Objective justification / efficiencies

↓

Competition-law or contractual infringement

↓

Causation

↓

Damages / regulatory remedy

31. Conclusion

Affiliate ecosystem dependency becomes legally significant when a platform's control over traffic, ranking, attribution, commissions, data or technical infrastructure is used in a manner that exploits trading partners or excludes competing businesses.

The most useful European authorities are Google Shopping for self-preferencing, Amazon Marketplace for the use of non-public ecosystem data, Bronner for access, Slovak Telekom and Deutsche Telekom for vertically related markets and pricing, Intel for exclusionary incentives, Servizio Elettrico Nazionale for leveraging, and Meta Platforms for the intersection between data and competition.

The key distinction is:

Dependency alone is not necessarily unlawful; manipulation combined with dominance, exclusionary effects, contractual abuse, or regulatory violations can create liability.

European enforcement is also moving beyond traditional Article 102 analysis through the DMA and DSA, particularly where large platforms control the infrastructure on which dependent businesses and affiliates operate. The Commission's recent DMA and DSA enforcement demonstrates the increasing regulatory attention to platform ecosystems, steering, ranking, transparency and affiliate-programme risks. (Digital Markets Act (DMA))

Exam Keywords

Affiliate ecosystem – economic dependency – platform dependency – affiliate network – self-preferencing – ranking manipulation – commission manipulation – attribution manipulation – data exploitation – non-public business data – foreclosure – vertical integration – Article 101 TFEU – Article 102 TFEU – DMA – DSA – steering – tying – margin squeeze – refusal of access – Bronner – Google Shopping – Amazon Marketplace – Meta Platforms – switching costs – network effects – API access – affiliate commissions – causation – private damages – abuse of economic dependence.